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ARTICLE

THE CRIMINAL CLASS ACTION

†

ADAM S. ZIMMERMAN & DAVID M. JAROS

††

Over the past ten years, in a variety of high-profile corporate scandals,
prosecutors have sought billions of dollars in restitution for crimes ranging
from environmental dumping and consumer scams to financial fraud. In
what we call “criminal class action” settlements, prosecutors distribute that
money to groups of victims as in a civil class action while continuing to pursue
the traditional criminal justice goals of retribution and deterrence.
Unlike civil class actions, however, the emerging criminal class action lacks
critical safeguards for victims entitled to compensation. While prosecutors are
encouraged, and even required by statute, to seek victim restitution, they lack
adequate rules requiring them to (1) coordinate with other civil lawsuits that seek
the same relief for victims, (2) hear victims’ claims, (3) identify conflicts between
different parties, and (4) divide the award among victims. We argue that prosecutors should continue to play a role in compensating victims for widespread
harm. However, when prosecutors compensate multiple victims in a criminal
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class action, prosecutors should adopt rules similar to those that exist in private
litigation to ensure that the victims receive fair and efficient compensation.
We propose four solutions to give victims more voice in their own redress
while preserving prosecutorial discretion: (1) that prosecutors and courts coordinate overlapping settlements before a single federal judge, (2) that prosecutors
involve representative stakeholders in settlement discussions through a mediation-like process, (3) that courts subject prosecutors’ distribution plans to independent review to police potential conflicts of interest, and (4) that prosecutors
adopt the distribution guidelines the American Law Institute developed for
large-scale civil litigation to balance victims’ competing interests.
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed the rise of new, massive settlements
forged not out of civil litigation but on the periphery of the criminal
justice system. Since 2003, prosecutors have demanded that defendants in a variety of high-profile corporate scandals set up multimillion-dollar restitution funds for victims to settle criminal charges.
Yet few rules exist for the prosecutors who create and distribute these
complex settlements. Consider three examples:
(1) In September 2004, software giant Computer Associates conceded that it had unlawfully inflated its quarterly earnings reports by
using shadow accounting practices that effectively backdated lucrative
1
licensing contracts. As part of its agreement with the U.S. Attorney’s
Office, Computer Associates agreed to establish a $225 million restitu2
tion fund to compensate shareholders injured by the scandal.
Months after the fund was announced, however, not a single shareholder had come forward with a proposal for how to dispense the
money in a fair and appropriate manner.3
(2) Shortly after Bernard Madoff committed the largest criminal
4
fraud in United States history, federal prosecutors sought to compen5
sate victims with his seized assets. In what some have called “reality6
show kind of fighting,” Madoff’s victims sharply contested the distribution of his property. Because of the nature of the fraud, some long1

Press Release, SEC, SEC Files Securities Fraud Charges Against Computer Associates International, Inc., Former CEO Sanjay Kumar, and Two Other Former Company
Executives (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-134.htm.
2
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, United States v. Computer Assocs., No. 040837 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/
prosecution_agreements/pdf/computerassociates.pdf.
3
See Gretchen Morgenson, Giving Away Lots of Money is Easy, Right?, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 13, 2005, at BU1.
4
See Diana B. Henriques, Madoff, Apologizing, Is Given 150 Years, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2009, at A1.
5
See Government’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion Pursuant to Title 18,
United States Code, Section 3664(d)(5), at 2, United States v. Madoff, No. 09-0213
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/
061909motionrerestitution.pdf. A bankruptcy trustee now overseeing the claims process
for investors, Irving H. Picard, decided to pay investors based on how much they invested
with Madoff and how much they withdrew before the scheme collapsed. See Sec. Investor
Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC),
424 B.R. 122, 132 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing the competing claims of three
classes of victims); Diana B. Henriques, It’s Thankless, but He Decides Madoff Claims, N.Y.
TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A1 (describing the controversial method for paying claims).
6
Eric Konigsberg, Investors in a Competition for a Piece of the Madoff Pie, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2009, at B1.
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term investors lost their life savings. Others, who withdrew funds over
time, made less than they thought, but actually profited from the
scheme. Still others lost millions through “feeder funds” without ever
7
investing with Madoff directly. Prosecutors, however, lacked any rules
to hear and resolve victims’ competing claims to Madoff’s estate.
(3) After the pharmaceutical company Eli Lilly reached a $1.2 billion settlement with 30,000 plaintiffs for side effects associated with its
antipsychotic drug Zyprexa,8 federal prosecutors launched a separate
9
criminal case to recover $1.4 billion in restitution. Although both actions sought overlapping monetary damages against the same defendant and for the same conduct, no formal procedures existed to ensure that victims were not doubly compensated or to prevent
defendants from being punished twice for the same misconduct.10
Had all three cases proceeded only in civil litigation, the result
would have been decidedly different. From the start, counsel for the
shareholders in Computer Associates, guided in part by the strength of
their legal claims, would have negotiated and participated in the dis11
cussions over the amount and distribution of the settlement. The
Madoff victims would have been entitled to an array of procedural
protections, separate attorney representation, and payouts based on
7
8

Id.
See Alex Berenson, Lilly Settles with 18,000 over Zyprexa, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5. 2007, at

C1.
9

In January 2009, Lilly pled guilty in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to federal criminal charges of selling misbranded drugs in interstate commerce. Press Release,
Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Resolves Investigations of Past Zyprexa Marketing and Promotional Practices ( Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://newsroom.lilly.com/releasedetail.
cfm?ReleaseID=359242.
10
The civil settlement related to Zyprexa had already set aside over $43 million to
reimburse Medicare, Medicaid, and other welfare expenditures by the United States
and all fifty state governments. See Hood v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab.
Litig.), 671 F. Supp. 2d 397, 404-05 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing parallel proceedings
and government payouts). In addition, the United States sought to recover similar
losses through a criminal restitution agreement with Eli Lilly in another court. Id. at
406. Although no formal procedures existed to coordinate the criminal and civil actions, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York, charged by the Judicial
Panel for Multidistrict Litigation( JPML) to coordinate all federal civil cases against Eli
Lilly, informally worked with the criminal court and other state courts to ensure the
civil settlement was fair. See id. at 402-08 (describing informal coordination efforts).
11
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.05 (2010) (describing
judicial authority to appoint lead counsel or committees of counsel); id. § 3.09 (describing the use of special masters or settlement judges to oversee or facilitate settlement); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT
OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 143-46 (1995)
(describing negotiation tactics of special settlement masters in the Brooklyn Naval
Yard, Dalkon Shield, and Agent Orange cases).
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12

their different statuses and needs. The Zyprexa cases would have
been centralized before a single federal judge for pretrial coordina13
tion and review.
For years, private lawsuits in the United States have been the pri14
mary tool to ensure people pay damages to those they harm. When
many people are hurt, special litigation procedures exist for defen15
dants to compensate victims comprehensively. Although those procedures are far from perfect, class action, bankruptcy, and other multiparty litigation rules try to accomplish at least three things: (1) to
ensure parties meaningfully participate in a process that affects their
substantive rights, (2) to empower judges to police conflicts of interest
between injured parties and their representatives, and (3) to facilitate
16
a final resolution of the dispute accurately and efficiently.
12

See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78eee(a)(3) (2006) (directing courts to appoint a trustee
and remove the liquidation proceeding to bankruptcy court when a registered broker
or dealer is unable to meet obligations to investors); see also Trustee’s First Interim Report for the Period December 11, 2008 Through June 30, 2009, Sec. Investor Prot.
Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC (In re Bernard L. Madoff Inv. Sec. LLC), No.
08-1789 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2009) [hereinafter First Interim Report], available at
http://www.madofftrustee.com/documents/TrusteeInterimReport_090709.pdf
(summarizing bankruptcy court proceedings, objections to claims determinations, and
claims administration for the first six months of the bankruptcy trust operation); see
also Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming May
2011) (manuscript at 1-2) (comparing the procedural protections afforded to victims
under bankruptcy, private class actions, and SEC actions).
13
The multidistrict litigation statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006), has led to global
resolutions for thousands of complex civil cases. See Yvette Ostolaza & Michelle Hartmann, Overview of Multidistrict Litigation Rules at the State and Federal Level, 26 REV. LITIG.
47 (2007) (collecting cases); Daniel A. Richards, An Analysis of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation’s Selection of Transferee District and Judge, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 311, 329
(2009) (analyzing 303 transfer orders during a four and a half year period).
14
See 1 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 82 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1859) (“The liability to make reparation . . . rests upon an original
moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself or exercise his own
rights as not to injure another.” (emphasis omitted)); John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115
YALE L.J. 524, 541-49 (2005) (tracing the history of tort law as a tool to seek public redress for private harm).
15
Many procedures evolved out of equitable doctrines that tried to bring together
all persons whose rights were affected by “any particular litigation and to render a
complete decree adjusting all the rights and protecting all the parties against future
litigations.” CHARLES W. BACON & FRANKLYN S. MORSE, THE REASONABLENESS OF THE
LAW 204 (1924); see also Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 921 (1987)
(“[F]rom the beginning, equity’s expansiveness led to larger cases . . . than were customary with common law practice.”).
16
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.03 (describing general principles of aggregate litigation); WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 134-43 (describing
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Recently, another body of law—criminal law—has begun to assume the same compensatory role as the large private lawsuit. Since
2003, federal prosecutors increasingly have sought to settle charges
with corporate defendants in exchange for multimillion dollar victim
17
18
restitution funds —or what we call “criminal class actions.” Despite
the fact that victims are not technically parties to the case, these crim19
inal settlements include massive restitution awards that appear to
mimic civil class actions. Like class action settlements, criminal class
action agreements take advantage of economies of scale by efficiently
compensating multiple people through a single, comprehensive
scheme. And while prosecutors, rather than private attorneys, negotiate the size of the award, the end result is typically a large fund managed by the very same private administrators who oversee civil class
20
action settlements.
the history and purposes of class actions, bankruptcy, and multiparty consolidations in
mass tort cases); Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1115-20
(2010) (identifying access, efficiency, and equity as the goals of aggregate litigation).
17
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-636T, CORPORATE CRIME: PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON DOJ’S USE AND OVERSIGHT OF DEFERRED PROSECUTION
AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 1 (2009) (finding that the Department of Justice
“entered into 3 such agreements in 2002 compared to 41 such agreements in 2007”);
Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 900 (2007) (collecting agreements and finding that of the total $4.95 billion sought against many corporate defendants, eighty-six percent was not for punitive fines, but rather for large
civil compensation awards).
18
Criminal procedure does not have a class action rule, like Rule 23 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, in part because of the due process concerns that aggregating
criminal cases generally raises. For example, each criminal defendant enjoys a personal right to decide whether to enter a plea, testify, or cross-examine witnesses. See Rock
v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987) (describing personal rights in criminal trials that
otherwise complicate the aggregation of cases); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819
(1975) (“The Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made
for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense.”); see
also Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 394 (2007)
(“Unlike the civil system, the criminal system overwhelmingly prosecutes single defendants with only the sporadic and procedurally-restricted group trial involving conspiracies or co-participants.”). Rather, these cases function like class actions by spurring
large settlement funds for thousands of potential victim-claimants.
19
Even though criminal attorneys generally refer to the resolution of a criminal
case as an “agreement,” in this Article we use the terms “agreements” and “settlements”
interchangeably to reflect the parallel between large criminal restitution funds and
their civil counterparts.
20
For example, the U.S. Attorney picked Kenneth R. Feinberg, recently dubbed
by the Wall Street Journal as the “Special Master of America,” to oversee the $225 million
fund for defrauded stockholders in Computer Associates. See Morgenson, supra note 3;
see also Ashby Jones, Spotlight on Ken Feinberg: The Special Master of America, WALL ST. J. L.
BLOG ( Jan. 14, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/01/14/spotlight-onken-feinberg-the-special-master-of-america. Similarly, in 2002, former New York Attor-
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Unlike civil class actions, however, criminal class action settlements lack procedures to hear victims’ claims. No rules guarantee
that an attorney or representative will advocate on behalf of different
stakeholders as to the appropriate size and distribution of the award.
No court or administrative process exists to check conflicts of interest
among victim groups. To complicate matters further, a prosecutor
may target the same wrongdoer, for the same funds, and on behalf of
21
the same set of victims as parties to a privately initiated lawsuit. Even
so, few guidelines instruct prosecutors on how to properly coordinate
22
with private lawsuits. Finally, virtually no guidelines exist for how
prosecutors, or their appointed agents, should divide these multimillion-dollar awards among victims.
Many have observed that prosecutors and private litigants increasingly use the threat of litigation to regulate the same kinds of con23
duct. Some have gone so far as to characterize prosecutors’ use of
criminal settlement agreements as a form of “structural reform litiga-

ney General Eliot Spitzer settled civil and criminal charges under New York State’s
Martin Act with the nation’s largest investment banks for over $1.4 billion. See Press
Release, SEC, NY Attorney General, NASD, NASAA, SEC, NYSE and State Regulators
Announce Historic Agreement to Reform Investment Practices: $1.4 Billion Global
Settlement Includes Penalties and Funds for Investors (Dec. 20, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-179.htm. Frances McGovern, a well-known
scholar in the area of mass torts who has administered many multibillion dollar settlement funds, was appointed to oversee the distribution. SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626
F. Supp. 2d 402, 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
21
Professor Brandon L. Garrett maintains a collection of almost all federal deferred
and nonprosecution agreements after 2003. See Brandon L. Garrett & Jon Ashley, Federal
Organizational Prosecution Agreements, U. VA. L. SCH., http://www.law.virginia.edu/
html/librarysite/garrett_bycompany.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2011); see also Garrett,
supra note 17, at 938 (collecting data through 2007). According to our review of those
agreements, more than half of the federal agreements that provided victim compensation were accompanied by civil class actions or administrative agency actions for similar
relief.
22
See, e.g., Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys § X.A (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (observing that prosecutors “may consider” whether civil litigation would “adequately deter, punish, and rehabilitate a corporation that has engaged in wrongful conduct”).
23
See, e.g., Miriam Hechler Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 106567 (2008) (criticizing “regulation by prosecution”); Garrett, supra note 17, at 861-75
(explaining how prosecutors use their discretion to pursue structural reform similar to
that in the civil rights litigation context); see also David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445,
1448 (2010) (describing the “ever-expanding nature of the criminal law . . . in the direction of broader liability”).
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24

tion,” a term that describes the use of civil litigation to improve institutional behavior. However, few have addressed criminal law’s new
role—one historically performed by private litigation—as a provider
25
of compensation to large groups of people. No commentator has
examined the procedures that prosecutors should follow and the
principles that should guide a criminal class action.
This Article argues that prosecutors can and should continue to
compensate victims of widespread harm. However, prosecutors
should act only when the government is in a unique position to facilitate such compensation. Moreover, prosecutors should adopt internal
administrative procedures to hear from representatives of victim
groups with competing interests and to formulate guidelines for pay26
ment. Finally, where possible, courts should review criminal class ac27
tion settlements with a “hard look” to ensure that the distribution
scheme adequately balances the conflicting interests between various
parties and the prosecutor.
We note that there are significant differences between class action
settlements and criminal restitution funds, but those differences
should not be overstated. Because victims are not legal parties to a
criminal case, they are not entitled to the due process rights they
24

Garrett, supra, note 17, at 853; see also Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating
The ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 159, 161 (2008) (observing that some believe that the principal role of corporate
criminal prosecution is to “effect widespread structural reform”).
25
One notable exception is Judge Jack B. Weinstein, a jurist and scholar well
known for his expertise in complex litigation. See United States v. Cheung, 952 F.
Supp. 148, 149-51 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (Weinstein, J.) (describing the importance of and
reasons for coordinating civil and criminal litigation); United States v. Ferranti, 928 F.
Supp. 206, 219 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (Weinstein, J.) (discussing how the system of compensation for mass torts and environmental defects is in flux, and that it is unclear “[h]ow
far [the United States] will move towards an integrated criminal-civil-administrative
system”); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative, Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 955 (“The trend to compensate through governmental litigation marks a departure for the U.S. civil system.”).
26
Other scholars have argued that prosecutors should adopt internal administrative safeguards to ensure more transparency without unduly constraining prosecutorial
discretion. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 (2009); Gerard E. Lynch, Our
Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2117, 2149 (1998). This
Article advocates a similar approach to criminal class actions. See infra Part III.
27
Hard look review is already a well-established doctrine in the review of agency
decisions. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 & n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(discussing the roots of hard look review); see also Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism
Accountability: “Agency-Forcing” Measures, 58 DUKE L.J. 2125, 2181 (2009) (describing
hard look review as a tool “to ensure that agencies disclose relevant data and provide
reasoned responses to material objections raised during the rulemaking process”).
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28

would otherwise enjoy in civil litigation. However, as discussed below, victims have an array of statutory rights that entitle them not only
29
to restitution, but also to participate in the criminal process itself.
Similarly, while prosecutors do not formally represent victims as private attorneys do in a civil case, Congress has charged prosecutors to
30
seek victim input and recover restitution on their behalf. Additionally, unlike in a class action, principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel do not bar victims from filing their own lawsuits. However, a
criminal restitution fund may practically limit victims’ ability to recover civil damages when the fund requires that eligible victims waive
rights to civil claims, reduces plaintiffs’ bargaining power in civil litigation by decreasing the size of a putative class action, and depletes the
31
pool of funds available to defendants to pay civil awards. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, while the criminal justice system pursues
different goals than the civil system, both share an interest in prin32
cipled, efficient, and fair compensation.
In Part I, we describe the growing role prosecutors play in compensating victims for collectively felt harm, with a specific focus on
33
federal prosecutors. Over the past six years, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has sought compensation for large groups
of victims in a variety of cases typically resolved through complex civil
litigation, such as environmental crimes, consumer fraud actions, and
28

See, e.g., Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (holding that private
individuals lack a “judicially cognizable interest” in the prosecution of another person).
29
See infra subsection I.B.1. Prosecutors and their agents must make their “best
efforts” to, among other things, afford crime victims their rights to “full and timely restitution,” to consult with the prosecutor, to be heard in the district court in plea and
sentencing proceedings, and to be “treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity.” 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), (c) (2006). But see infra subsection I.B.2 (describing a lack of agreement over when such rights attach in the criminal process).
30
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5)–(6) (stating that victims have the right to “confer
with the attorney for the Government in the case” and the right to “full and timely restitution as provided in law”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(1) (“[T]he attorney for the
Government, after consulting, to the extent practicable, with all identified victims,
shall promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of the amounts subject to
restitution.”).
31
See infra Section I.B and subsection II.B.2.
32
See infra Section II.A.
33
Criminal class actions occur in the state system as well. See, e.g., Barbara Hoberock, MCI Coughs Up $280,000 Payment to State, TULSA WORLD, Mar. 31, 2005, at A1,
available at 2005 WLNR 24871305 (describing WorldCom’s agreement to pay $280,000
to create jobs for Oklahoma state residents in exchange for the dismissal of state felony
fraud charges). We focus on federal prosecutors because the DOJ makes those agreements available and because federal agreements tend to involve larger companies capable of establishing substantial restitution funds for victims.
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securities violations. These criminal class actions reflect federal prosecutors’ evolving response to two distinct developments in criminal
law. First, as victims’ rights advocates successfully moved criminal law
toward “a more victim-centered justice system,” prosecutors were encouraged—and sometimes required—to seek victim compensation
34
aggressively. Second, large corporate scandals like Enron prompted
the DOJ to shift its focus from punishing individual offenders to using
35
the criminal law to reform business practices.
The DOJ’s newly
adopted strategy created an opportunity for prosecutors to fashion
compensation schemes for large classes of victims harmed by wealthy
corporate criminals.
Part II compares the ways criminal and civil class actions compensate people. In general, large civil cases aim to serve diverse populations by following four kinds of rules: (1) rules that encourage people
to participate in the settlement, (2) rules that allow judges to resolve
conflicts of interest between participants, (3) rules that coordinate the
settlement with other forms of litigation, and (4) rules that govern the
36
distribution of awards among different classes of victims.
In contrast, few rules address how prosecutors should compensate
large classes of victims. While some federal statutes require “victimwitness coordinators” to identify victims and notify them about ongoing criminal proceedings, many of those same rules expressly exempt
complex cases like those that lead to criminal class action settle37
ments. Little judicial review exists to police conflicts of interest be38
tween parties. No procedures allow government officials to identify
conflicting stakeholders’ interests in the action, to coordinate overlapping civil and criminal class action settlements, or to assure that
victims are not over- or undercompensated.
Part III thus argues that prosecutors should adopt procedures that
govern class action lawyers and judges when prosecutors, in effect,
perform the same job. Prosecutors, however, need not borrow procedures wholesale from complex litigation. In contrast to purely private
actions, prosecutors need flexibility to adjust their criminal

34

See infra subsection I.B.1.
See infra subsection I.B.2.
36
See infra Section II.B.
37
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) (2006) (exempting restitution payments when
there are a large number of victims or when “complex issues of fact” complicate the
sentencing process); id. § 3771(d)(2) (providing an exception when the “number of
crime victims makes it impracticable” to enforce victims’ rights under federal law).
38
See infra Section III.C.
35
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investigations and settlement discussions to fulfill their historic mission
39
to fight crime. Furthermore, separation-of-powers principles require
40
some deference to a prosecutor’s authority to enforce the law.
We accordingly propose four solutions to give victims greater procedural protection while preserving prosecutorial discretion: (1) that
prosecutors adopt an administrative process that involves representative stakeholders in the settlement discussions, (2) that courts subject
prosecutors’ distribution plans to independent review to police potential conflicts of interest, (3) that prosecutors and courts coordinate
overlapping settlements before a single federal judge, and (4) that
prosecutors adopt the distribution guidelines the American Law Institute (ALI) developed for large-scale civil litigation, which seek to balance victims’ competing interests.
I. THE GROWING PHENOMENON OF THE CRIMINAL CLASS ACTION
A. The Definition of a Criminal Class Action
In a “criminal class action,” the prosecutor obtains restitution
from a criminal defendant who has caused widespread harm to a large
class of victims. Theoretically, prosecutors may seek group restitution
against both individuals and corporate defendants. But just as in the
civil system, most individual defendants cannot afford to pay large
41
classes of victims for the victims’ losses. Accordingly, most of the
criminal class actions we discuss involve large corporate defendants
who are capable of compensating many people.
39

See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (describing the need
for prosecutorial discretion); United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 285 (1943)
(trusting the “good sense of prosecutors”).
40
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (granting the executive branch power to “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed”); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364
(1978) (observing that when a prosecutor has probable cause, “the decision whether
or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally
rests entirely in his discretion”); see also Baer, supra note 23, at 1047 (“Absent some
showing of post-trial ‘vindictiveness’ or racially motivated behavior, the prosecutor’s
charging decision is sacrosanct.”).
41
Prosecutors have difficulty enforcing victim restitution judgments against individuals. Of the approximately $50 billion in outstanding criminal sanctions uncollected by the United States government in 2007, nearly $40 billion is victim restitution,
much of which is owed by individual defendants. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT tbls.8B & 8C (2007); see also Dickman, supra note
79, at 1695 (“The reason for such a strong connection between collection rates and
setting the amount of restitution in accordance with an offender’s ability to pay is that
an overwhelming majority of offenders do not have the financial resources to pay substantial restitution orders.”).

ZIMMERMAN & JAROS REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1396

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

4/13/2011 1:32 PM

[Vol. 159: 1385

When parties settle charges before trial, as is typically the case, the
prosecutor will demand that the defendants agree to a number of
conditions—including private monitoring, fines, and sometimes a
42
large victim restitution fund. That fund may be overseen by prosecutors, probation officers, a third-party administrator, or the corporate
defendant, whose task is to distribute money to victims. In this way,
the criminal class action is a variant of what some jurists and commen43
tators recently have dubbed “structural class actions.” In a structural
class action, court procedures are not used to collect and coordinate
common claims. Rather, a single institution, like an insurer, union, or
government agency, brings a single lawsuit that is predicated on harm
44
to many different people.
Large criminal cases that result in criminal class action settlements
may be resolved at any stage in the criminal process, but as we discuss
below, they often conclude before the prosecutor files charges against
45
the defendant. Between 2003 and 2009, the DOJ recovered over $6
billion in criminal restitution without a trial or, for that matter, much

42

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17 (analyzing the terms of
fifty-four criminal settlement agreements between federal prosecutors and corporate
defendants); Garrett, supra note 17 (collecting the terms of 150 agreements between
federal prosecutors and corporate defendants).
43
See, e.g., Hood v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig.), 671 F. Supp.
2d 397, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (describing “structural class actions” as cases in which a
single entity, such as a government actor, insurer, or union, “brings claims for reimbursement . . . founded upon large numbers of individual” parties’ damages). Richard
Nagareda has referred to this trend as “embedded aggregation.” Richard A. Nagareda,
Embedded Aggregation in Civil Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2010).
44
See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 344
F.3d 211, 228-29 (2d Cir. 2003) (certifying questions of law to the New York Court of
Appeals in an insurer action against major tobacco companies for New York State
smokers’ medical expenses); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co. (In re Zyprexa Prods.
Liab. Litig.), 253 F.R.D. 69, 201 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (describing overpayment claims by
third-party payors, like unions or other institutional plaintiffs, against Eli Lilly for consumers who purchased Zyprexa), rev’d, 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010); State v. Philip
Morris, No. 96122017, CL211487, 1997 WL 540913, at *20 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 21, 1997)
(approving attorney-general action against Philip Morris to recover health expenses
for individual smokers).
45
See infra Section II.B. Although the DOJ claims that pretrial agreements are
rare, the DOJ’s Criminal Division has entered into more pretrial diversion agreements
than it has prosecuted in the past five years for cases involving large multinational corporations. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, DOJ HAS TAKEN STEPS TO
BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD
EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 14-15 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10110.pdf (“[From 2004 to 2009], the Criminal Division pursued 0.9 times more prosecutions than [pretrial diversion] agreements . . . .”).
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46

judicial oversight. Those cases generally involved large corporate de47
48
fendants like Adelphia Communications, British Petroleum (BP),
49
50
51
America Online (AOL), Beazer Homes, and Computer Associates.
Of the more than 150 agreements that federal prosecutors reached
with corporate defendants before filing criminal charges, more than
30% provided for group-victim restitution awards with an average of
52
$120 million per agreement. Such large restitution awards are consistent with victims’ rights laws and the federal sentencing guidelines,

46

In 2009, the DOJ collected over $1 billion in corporate restitution and penalties
alone. Letter from Edward N. Siskel, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Eileen Larence, Dir. of
Homeland Sec. & Justice, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office 1-2 (Dec. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Siskel Letter], in U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, app. III.
Over $5 billion in restitution and other forms of compensation was collected between
2003 and 2007. See Garrett, supra note 17, app. A; see also Crime Without Conviction: The
Rise of Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements, CORP. CRIME REP. (Dec. 28, 2005),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/deferredreport.htm (detailing fines collected through nonprosecution (NPAs) and deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs)
with corporations between 1992 and 2005).
47
Adelphia paid $715 million in restitution to defrauded shareholders. According
to Adelphia’s agreement with federal prosecutors, the Attorney General and SEC
would disburse funds to victims “in such forms and amounts [to be determined] in
their sole discretion.” Letter from David N. Kelley, U.S. Attorney, to Alan Vinegrad et.
al., Counsel to Adelphia 3 (Apr. 25, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/
nys/adelphia/adelphianon-pros.pdf.
48
BP paid over $53 million into a restitution fund for direct and indirect purchasers of propane to settle criminal price-fixing charges as part of a larger settlement with
the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7-13, United States v. B.P. America Inc., No. 07-0683 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2007),
available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/bp.pdf.
49
AOL created a $150 million victim compensation fund to settle criminal securities fraud violations. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 2, United States v. Am. Online, Inc., No. 04-1133 (E.D. Va. Dec. 14, 2004), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/
Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/aol.pdf.
50
Beazer Homes agreed to pay up to $50 million in victim restitution to defrauded homebuyers through a “national restitution fund” as part of a larger agreement to settle federal housing fraud charges. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 6,
United States v. Beazer Homes USA, Inc., No. 09-0113 (W.D.N.C. July 1, 2009), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/beazer.pdf.
51
Computer Associates settled criminal securities violations by, among other
things, agreeing to set up a $225 million fund for victims. Deferred Prosecution
Agreement, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-0837 (E.D.N.Y Sept.
22, 2004), available at http://lib.law.virginia.edu/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/
pdf/computerassociates.pdf.
52
See Garrett & Ashley, supra note 21 (follow “Excel spreadsheet” link) (listing
fines for each organization). Only twelve such agreements appeared in the 1990s, few
of which provided for any victim compensation at all. See id.
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which instruct prosecutors to prioritize victim compensation when as53
sessing corporate criminal penalties.
As large criminal restitution awards increasingly look like multimillion dollar class action settlements, they confront similar obstacles
to ensure victims receive notice, compensation, and fair representation. Some criminal restitution funds have used mass mailings, tollfree phone services, and victim-witness coordinators to alert victims to
54
their rights in large criminal restitution funds. While few detailed
rules exist to notify or resolve claims between multiple parties in a
criminal class action, the notice forms used in both civil and criminal
class actions may be strikingly similar. They both may require victims
55
In a few cases, the
to give up rights to sue in civil litigation.
inattentive victim may never notice that a prosecutor, and not a
56
private plaintiff attorney, commenced the original action.
Because the volume of money and claims can overwhelm prosecutors, criminal class actions may also rely upon the same sophisticated
claim administrators used in the civil system to develop distribution
57
plans for potential victims. Federal courts, for example, may refer
complex restitution orders to magistrate judges and special masters,
who in turn may “require additional documentation or hear testimo58
ny” from victims. In cases where courts do not review the settlement
53

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1 (2010) (“As a general principle, the court should require that the organization take all appropriate steps to provide compensation to victims and otherwise remedy the harm caused or threatened by
the offense.”).
54
See, e.g., Federal and State Enforcement of Financial Consumer and Investor Protection
Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 8 (2009) (statement of
Rita Glavin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Criminal Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice),
available at http://judiciary.gov/ola/testimony/111-1/2009-03-20-crm-glavin-financialconsumer.pdf (“The Department’s many victim-witness coordinators and law enforcement officials work tirelessly to identify the victims in mortage fraud cases and to help
ensure that what money is recovered reaches them.”).
55
See, e.g., United States v. Rigas (In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co.), 409 F.3d 555,
563 (2d Cir. 2005) (describing a settlement requiring third-party releases).
56
Compare Notice of Claims Process for Distribution of the Restitution Fund, United States v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-0837 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), available at
http://www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/carf1not.pdf (notice for the
criminal restitution fund in Computer Associates), with Proof of Claim and Release, In re
Computer Assocs. Class Action Sec. Litig., 2007 WL 2713336 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (Nos. 984839, 02-1226, and 03-4199), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1010/
CA98/2003919_r06x_98CV04839.pdf (notice for the civil class action settlement in
Computer Associates).
57
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
58
18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(4)(6) (2006); see also United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp.
2d. 378, 384 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (referring the question of sufficiency of a $90 million in vic-
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agreement at all, prosecutors still may refer cases to a third party. For
example, when BP was accused of fixing prices in the propane market,
the prosecutor required that BP establish a $53 million victim restitu59
tion fund to be overseen by a special administrator.
Finally, criminal restitution funds struggle to serve multiple classes
of victims who may have very different interests in the award. In the
$225 million Computer Associates settlement, for example, institutional
investors, bondholders, and individual stockholders ultimately peti60
tioned the administrator to distribute funds differently. But such
conflicts may pale in comparison to the conflicts victims have with
prosecutors themselves. Prosecutors may seek deals with corporate
defendants to obtain information about other criminal parties or to
reduce collateral impact of a large award on innocent third-parties
61
Politically ambitious prosecutors
like employees or shareholders.
may prioritize a rapid resolution and big headlines at the expense of
62
victims’ different interests in compensation.
tim restitution to a federal magistrate); United States v. Salim, 287 F. Supp. 2d 250, 258
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (appointing two special masters to determine the amount of restitution).
59
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 48, at 9 (calling for BP to appoint a “Third Party Administrator” to be approved by the Department of Justice); see
also Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 50, at 6 (requiring the appointment
of a claims administrator to oversee victim restitution fund to defrauded homebuyers).
60
See Plan of Allocation for Restitution Fund at 2 n.2, United States v. Computer
Assocs. Int’l, Inc., No. 04-0837 (E.D.N.Y. July 21, 2005), available at http://
www.computerassociatesrestitutionfund.com/pdf/carf1plan.pdf (describing disputed
claims by holders, purchasers, and sellers of defendants’ stock). But cf. Morgenson,
supra note 3 (describing “investor passivity” in coming up with ideas to disburse funds).
61
See, e.g., Accountability, Transparency, and Uniformity in Corporate Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. Law, 111th
Cong. 93 (2009) (statement of Chuck Rosenberg, former U.S. Attorney) (considering
DPAs as a middle ground between allowing corporate crime to go unpunished and the
“staggering collateral costs to innocent parties that far exceed the benefits of prosecution
itself”), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Rosenberg090625.pdf;
John Ashcroft, Op-Ed., Bailout Justice, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 2009, at A27 (“Think of the effect on the community if these companies had been shuttered: employees would have
lost their jobs, shareholders and pensioners would have lost their savings and countless
people in need of hip and knee replacement would have been out of luck . . . .”).
62
See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 403 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(chastising the government for “tortured restructuring and embarrassing
consequences” that resulted from the failure to identify investor losses). Perhaps unsurprisingly, Eliot Spitzer and Chris Christie, two prosecutors-turned-governors, sought
to create massive restitution funds in connection with highly publicized corporate misconduct. See Barbara Moses, The “Discovery” of Analysts Conflicts on Wall Street, 70 BROOK.
L. REV. 89, 99-105 (2004) (describing the evolution of the global settlement between
the investment banks, government actors, and former New York Attorney Eliot Spitzer); Stephanie Saul, Bristol Meyers Seen Settling Case by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2005, at
C1 (describing the terms of Chris Christie’s $300 million settlement with Bristol Meyers).
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The recent movement toward group criminal restitution is just the
beginning. Recent high-profile criminal investigations of Goldman
63
Sachs and BP may lead to enormous settlements. If so, government
attorneys will be responsible for doling out billions of dollars in restitution to many classes of victims—from sophisticated victims, like
traders and institutional investors, to comparatively unsophisticated
64
victims, like homeowners, deep-sea fisherman, and retirees. Few express rules or procedures, however, say how they should do so.
As set forth below, the practical absence of procedures for harm
compensation developed, in part, because of two trends in criminal
law: (1) the increasing impact of the victims’ rights movement on laws
requiring criminal restitution and (2) prosecutors’ evolving role in
regulating corporate behavior.
B. The Origins of the Criminal Class Action
The criminal class action is the product of two distinct developments in criminal law that fundamentally changed the role of the federal prosecutor. First, victims’ rights advocates successfully convinced
prosecutors to revise their traditional offender-based goals of retribution and deterrence to include restitution for victims. Second, in
response to post-Enron corporate fraud scandals, prosecutors adopted
65
a “bold new prosecutorial mission” to regulate corporate America by
using the threat of indictment to encourage sweeping institutional reforms. As a result, prosecutors started to focus more intently on restitution just as they found themselves in a position to negotiate generous compensation awards on behalf of large classes of victims. Moreover, as prosecutors made restitution a significant component of the
agreements they executed with corporate defendants, large compen63

At the time of this writing, BP had agreed to establish an unprecedented $20
billion dollar fund to be administered by Kenneth R. Feinberg. Jackie Calmes, For Gulf
Victims, Mediator with Deep Pockets and Broad Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2010, at A17.
Goldman Sachs has agreed to a record $550 million settlement with the SEC, part of
which will compensate injured investors. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay
Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO ( July
15, 2010), available at http://sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm. Although neither settlement resolves both companies’ pending criminal investigations, such government-driven settlements on behalf of thousands of victims raise the same concerns
as other criminal class actions discussed herein.
64
Peter J. Henning, Looking for Liability in the BP Oil Spill, NYTIMES.COM DEALBOOK ( June 7, 2010, 9:30 AM), available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/06/07/looking-for-liability-in-bps-gulf-oil-spill (describing possible criminal and
civil penalties against BP).
65
Garrett, supra note 17, at 858.
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sation schemes were increasingly fashioned outside the scope of the
federal statutes designed to protect victims and without the benefit of
judicial review.
1. Prosecutors as Compensators
Criminal restitution has always been “embedded in common
66
law.” Even as common law crimes gradually disappeared from the
67
American system, the idea that the criminal law should make victims
whole did not fully disappear from the public consciousness. In 1925,
Congress gave federal courts the authority to suspend sentences and
68
order restitution as a condition of a defendant’s probation. In the
1970s, victims’ rights advocates urged politicians to return victims to
69
their central role within the criminal justice system. The victims’
rights movement argued that crime victims “were a discrete and un70
served minority that deserved equal justice under law.” In so doing,
they expressly highlighted the historical antecedents of restitution to
71
support their claim that crime victims were not treated fairly.
By the 1990s, policymakers in the United States adopted the language of the victims’ rights movement wholesale, emphatically declaring that the “‘principle of restitution is an integral part of virtually
every formal system of criminal justice, of every culture and every
72
time.’” Whatever else the “sanctioning power of society” does to pu-

66

United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 378, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *356).
67
See Thomas W. Merrill, The Disposing Power of the Legislature, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 456-61 (2010) (explaining the development of the public prosecutor’s monopoly
on criminal prosecutions and the disappearance of common law crimes).
68
See Act of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, repealed by Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, § 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1837, 1987.
69
See Edna Erez & Julian Roberts, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System
(outlining the rise of the victims’ role in the judicial system), in VICTIMS OF CRIME 277
(Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007); David E. Aaronson, New Rights and Remedies: The
Federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act of 2004, 28 PACE L. REV. 623, 627-28 (2008) (describing
different developments in the law aimed at granting victims of crimes better remedies).
70
Jon Kyl et al., On the Wings of Their Angels: The Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper,
Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L.
REV. 581, 584 (2005).
71
See, e.g., Bruce Jacobs, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview (citing the
Code of Hammurabi and other historical legal codes to buttress arguments about the
need for victims’ compensation), in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 45, 45-51 ( Joe
Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1977).
72
S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 12 (1995) (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 30 (1982)),
reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 925.
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nish, Congress later found, it should require wrongdoers to “‘restore
73
the victim to his or her prior state of well-being.’”
The victims’ rights movement successfully reshaped the goals of
the criminal justice system and, accordingly, the role of the prosecu74
tor. Not only did this result in a normative shift that made compensation for victims an important criminal justice priority, it led to the
passage of several federal statutes aimed at addressing the role of the
victim in the criminal justice system. Chief among these were the Vic75
tim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, the Victims’ Rights and Res76
77
titution Act of 1990, the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996,
and the Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Lourna
78
Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime Victims’ Rights Act (CVRA). With each
piece of legislation, Congress encouraged, and at times compelled,
prosecutors to take a more aggressive role in recovering victim com79
pensation. To ensure prosecutors adopted a “more victim-centered”
approach, Congress also granted victims three kinds of rights in the
restitution process: rights to participation, fair representation, and
equitable compensation.
Federal laws and regulations reinforce the right of victims to participate in the criminal process, for example, by affording victims the
80
right to notice and to be heard. Throughout the duration of the
criminal case, prosecutors, victim-witness coordinators, probation of73

Id.; see also A Bill to Provide for Restitution of Victims of Crimes, and for Other Purposes:
Hearing on S. 173 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 1-2 (1995) (statement
of Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (advocating for lawmakers
to recognize victims’ rights); 141 CONG. REC. 3911 (1995) (statement of Rep. Mark Foley) (“For far too long we have forgotten the innocent victims of crime.”).
74
See, e.g., Douglas Evan Beloof, The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 289, 290 (observing that the victims’ rights movement
“has shaken conventional assumptions about the criminal process to their foundation”).
75
Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–
1515, 3579–3580 (2006)).
76
Pub. L. No. 101-647, tit. V, 104 Stat. 4789, 4820-23 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 10606–10607).
77
Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. II, 110 Stat. 1214, 1227-41 (codified as amended in scattered section of 18 U.S.C.).
78
Pub. L. No. 108-405, tit. I, 118 Stat. 2260, 2261-65 (2004) (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 10603d–10603e).
79
The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, for example, was hailed as part
of a move “‘toward a more victim-centered justice system’” that would help transform a
criminal justice system that Congress believed was ignoring the plight of victims. Matthew Dickman, Comment, Should Crime Pay?: A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687, 1688-89 (2009) (quoting S. REP. NO.
104-179, at 18 (1995)).
80
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(2), (4).
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ficers, and even clerks of the court must identify and notify potential
victims about important proceedings that take place throughout the
81
criminal case. Victims also have a “reasonable right to confer” with
prosecutors and probation officers before criminal indictment, trial,
82
or sentencing. Finally, victims may appear and petition the court before, during, or after trial, unless their appearance interferes with the
83
defendant’s ability to obtain a fair trial.
Federal laws also provide a limited right to representation, particularly when victims have conflicts of interests with the prosecuting attorney. Inside the DOJ, a Victims’ Rights Ombudsman may hear
complaints lodged by victims against the federal prosecutor handling
84
the case. Outside the DOJ, victims may move separately in federal
85
court to enforce their rights. If the district court denies the victim’s
request—such as a request to be heard—the victim can petition the
86
court of appeals for a writ of mandamus.
Finally, federal law guarantees victims the right to “full” compen87
sation. Prosecutors must seek restitution for certain crimes whenever “an identifiable victim or victims” suffer any “physical injury or pe88
cuniary loss.” The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, while no longer
89
binding, direct courts in such cases to enter restitution orders and to
impose victim compensation as a condition of probation or supervised

81

Id. § 3771(c)(1).
Id. § 3771(a)(5); see also id. § 3664(d)(1) (“Upon the request of the probation
officer . . . the attorney for the government after consulting . . . with all identified victims, shall promptly provide the probation officer with a listing of amounts subject to
restitution.”).
83
Id. § 3771(b), (d); see also United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 321-22
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (analyzing the CVRA in detail).
84
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(2)(A) (directing the DOJ to create an administrative
authority to monitor compliance with the act).
85
See id. § 3771(d)(1) (“The crime victim or the crime victim’s lawful representative . . . may assert the rights described in subsection (a).”); see also In re Dean, 527 F.3d
391, 395-96 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing the CVRA-established victims’ right to confer
with the attorney for the government); United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411,
417 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (opining that the CVRA may provide a cause of action in federal court for victims even in the absence of a criminal prosecution).
86
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3).
87
Id. § 3771(a)(6); see also Dolan v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (2010)
(“‘[ J]ustice cannot be considered served until full restitution is made.’” (alteration in
original) (quoting S. REP. NO. 104-179, at 20 (1995))).
88
18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(1)(B).
89
See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 249-58 (2005) (rejecting the “mandatory” nature of the Sentencing Guidelines).
82
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90

release. Criminal restitution laws also observe a “collateral source”
rule. That is, a criminal defendant must pay restitution even if a victim is entitled to receive compensation “from the proceeds of insur91
ance or any other source,” including civil litigation. Victims, howev92
er, are not entitled to recover more than their losses.
While the victims’ rights movement successfully focused prosecutors on the importance of victim compensation, it fell short in its effort to codify that right in cases involving multiple victims. To avoid
overtaxing prosecutors, Congress expressly exempted overly “com93
plex” cases and cases with multiple victims. Instead, Congress settled
on a rule that only requires prosecutors to develop “reasonable” pro94
In so
cedures to enable victims to participate in complex cases.
doing, legislators acknowledged the practical constraints courts and
prosecutors faced in cases with thousands of victims. Congress does not
appear to have contemplated that prosecutors or judges would seek
95
massive restitution awards that rivaled class action settlements.
Nevertheless, despite the express exemption for complex cases,
some federal courts and prosecutors continue to require restitution in
96
large criminal cases involving widespread harm. For example, in one
90

See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B1.1(a)(2) (2007) (“In the case of
an identifiable victim, the court shall . . . impose a term of probation or supervised release with a condition requiring restitution for the full amount of the victim’s loss . . . .”).
91
18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(4)(B)(ii); id. § 3664( j)(1).
92
See id. § 3664( j)(2) (“Any amount paid to victim under an order of restitution
shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory damages for the same
loss . . . .”).
93
Id. § 3663A(c)(3).
94
Id. § 3771(d)(2).
95
In the floor debate that preceded the CVRA, policymakers discussed adopting
procedural safeguards to ensure victim participation in large criminal trials. The debate, however, ignored the issue of restitution. Rather, policymakers focused on the
logistical barriers facing the many victims who wanted to participate in the Oklahoma
City bombing trial. See 150 CONG. REC. 7303 (2004) (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (“This legislation is meant to ensure that cases like the McVeigh case, where victims of the Oklahoma City bombing were effectively denied the right to attend the trial
and to avoid federal appeals courts from determining, as the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals did, that victims had no standing to seek review of their right to attend the trial under the former victims’ law that this bill replaces.”); see also id. at 7303-04 (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (indicating that the CVRA requires courts to identify methods to
handle complex cases).
96
See, e.g., United States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“[T]he district court abused its discretion by relying on the perceived complexity of
the restitution determination and the availability of a more suitable forum to decline
to order restitution for future lost income.”); see also United States v. Brennan, 526 F.
Supp. 2d 378, 384-86 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (listing several cases involving a large number of
victims where the courts still required full restitution).
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case involving a $193 million criminal restitution fund for over 10,000
victims, the court found “meritless [the defendant’s] argument that
97
the number of victims is too large for restitution to be practicable.”
In a criminal securities case involving Adelphia, the Second Circuit
approved the prosecutor’s request to establish a $715 million fund to
98
compensate victims of securities fraud.
The DOJ provides few instructions to guide prosecutors, or their
appointed agents, who seek to create and distribute large restitution
awards. The Attorney General Guidelines for Victim and Witness Assistance states that in large cases, “responsible officers may publish a
99
notice in a manner designed to reach as many victims as possible.”
Nor do guidelines exist to ensure that the interests of different categories of victims hurt by the same conduct are fairly represented. Rather, after “consultation” with the victims, the prosecutor may make
an “independent determination” regarding the losses that may be
100
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Moreover, no assurances exist in complex cases that victims will be
compensated fairly and accurately. Probation officers and victimwitness coordinators, often charged with identifying the amount of
money at stake, may avoid doing so by informing the court that they
101
cannot “ascertain” the number or identity of victims.
A court may
102
set restitution without regard to other pending litigation.
More troubling is the fact that cases involving the greatest amount
of money and victims—large corporate cases—are particularly likely to
be resolved before an indictment. As a result, they fall outside the
scope of the federal statutes designed to ensure victims’ participation
103
in their own redress.
As set forth below, in these instances, large97

United States v. Catoggio, 326 F.3d 323, 328 (2d Cir. 2003); see also United States v.
Khan, 193 F. App’x 700, 702 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding to the district court because it
did not clearly make a determination that calculation of victims’ actual losses would
complicate or prolong the sentencing process so as to outweigh the need for restitution).
98
United States v. Rigas (In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co.), 409 F.3d 555, 563-64
(2d Cir. 2005).
99
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR VICTIM AND WITNESS
ASSISTANCE 41 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olp/pdf/ag_guidelines.pdf.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 42.
102
See United States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 3664 (2006) and concluding that the court does not need to wait for other
compensation decisions before it fashions a remedy).
103
Courts disagree about precisely what triggers a victim’s right to consult with the
prosecuting attorney. Compare United States v. BP Products N. Am. Inc., No. 07-0434,
2008 WL 501321, at *11, *12 n.7 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (finding that the CVRA
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scale compensation packages are crafted in an ad hoc manner without
the benefit of judicial review and without binding statutory protection
for victims.
2. Prosecutors as Regulators
The DOJ’s newly adopted strategy of business reform creates an
opportunity for prosecutors to fashion large compensation schemes
without significant judicial oversight. The DOJ currently focuses on
104
reforming corrupt corporate cultures instead of pursuing large cor105
porate fines and incarcerating individual offenders.
Although the
DOJ originally pursued structural reform through plea agreements,
prosecutors increasingly seek pretrial diversion agreements in which
they agree not to seek a conviction, and in return, corporations agree
to a number of conditions designed to correct past misdeeds and control future behavior. Such agreements may include provisions for new
compliance programs, independent monitors, fines, and often, victim
106
compensation.
This new strategy has important implications for victims. On the
one hand, victims may benefit from the overwhelming leverage prosecutors have in preindictment negotiations to extract large restitution
awards from corporate defendants—sums that can potentially exceed
107
the amount authorized by statute following a conviction.
On the
other hand, pretrial diversion agreements are subject to extremely li108
Moreover, the applicability of victims’ rights
mited judicial review.
clearly provided for rights that apply “before any prosecution is underway”), with United States v. Merkosky, No. 02-0168, 2008 WL 1744762, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2008)
(noting that the CVRA “does not confer any rights upon a victim until a prosecution is
already begun”).
104
See Thompson Memo, supra note 22, at 1 (“Indicting corporations for wrongdoing enables the government to address and be a force for positive change of corporate
culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover, and punish white collar crime.”).
105
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 17, at 860 (indicating that prosecutors increasingly
use structural-reform settlements in exchange for nonprosecution agreements); Spivack & Raman, supra note 24, at 161 (noting a change in DOJ policy in the corporate
context to regulate corporate culture, rather than to pursue criminal convictions).
106
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 1 (explaining how
the DOJ can use DPAs and NPAs to monitor companies).
107
See Spivack & Raman, supra note 24, at 182.
108
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 17, at 860 (observing that “[j]udicial review is also
very deferential at the charging stage . . . giving prosecutors especially wide discretion”); Benjamin M. Greenblum, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1870 (2005)
(“The judiciary’s limited role in deferred prosecution may explain the substance of
criticisms lodged against the deferral mechanism.”).
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laws may vary depending on where the case is in the criminal process.
As a result, victims may depend entirely upon the prosecutor to solicit
their input affirmatively, to represent their interests adequately, and
to distribute settlement proceeds fairly and equitably.
The use of pretrial diversion agreements skyrocketed after Arthur
Andersen’s collapse, when the DOJ realized that prosecutors needed to
take into account the severe collateral consequences of indicting or
109
convicting large corporations.
Prosecutors also discovered that they
often “get better results more quickly” when they negotiate with corpo110
rations under the threat of indictment than when they go to trial.
Moreover, corporations favor resolving cases before indictment to avoid
the immediate costs of litigation, the collateral costs of indictment, and
111
the even higher costs associated with a potential conviction.
Pretrial diversion agreements fall into two categories based upon
the timing of the settlement. Nonprosecution agreements (NPAs) occur before charges are filed, and the agreement is maintained by the
112
parties.
Deferred-prosecution agreements (DPAs) occur after the
113
government has filed a formal charging document with the court.
Notwithstanding the proliferation of pretrial diversion agreements
114
over the past decade, prosecutors may also pursue a third settlement

109

See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 17, at 879-80 (describing the devastating collateral
consequences of indictment and characterizing the Andersen case as a “turning point”
for the DOJ); Thompson Memo, supra note 22, at 3 (instructing prosecutors to consider the “collateral consequences” of indictment on “shareholders, pension holders and
employees not proven personally culpable”).
110
Vanessa Blum, Justice Deferred: The Feds’ New Weapon of Choice Makes Companies
Turn Snitch to Save Themselves, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 21, 2005, at 1.
111
See Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing Guidelines: The Cart Before the
Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 352-53 (1993) (noting the high costs of criminal proceedings by factoring in all the “collateral costs” of a potential prosecution); Greenblum,
supra note 108, at 1885-86 (explaining that collateral costs are typically higher for corporations than individuals, which helps elucidate why corporations have a strong incentive to reach a preprosecution agreement); Spivack & Raman, supra note 24, at 18789 (concluding that use of DPAs and NPAs will grow because there are benefits for
both companies and prosecutors, but noting the need for better guidance).
112
See Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Attorney Gen., to the
Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys 1 n.2 (March 7, 2008) [hereinafter
Morford Memo] (“Non-prosecution agreement[s] . . . [are] maintained by the parties
rather than being filed with a court.”).
113
See id. (“[A] deferred prosecution agreement is typically predicated upon the
filing of a formal charging document by the government, and the agreement is filed
with the appropriate court.”).
114
See Spivack & Raman, supra note 24, at 159 (providing evidence of the increased use of these agreements by government prosecutors).
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option, the plea bargain, in situations that they deem to warrant an
actual criminal conviction.
Courts scrutinize prosecution agreements more carefully as the
case progresses through the criminal process. Courts generally do not
115
review NPAs, only rarely review DPAs, and will review plea agree116
ments with great deference. Courts’ resistance to judicial review of
criminal settlement agreements can be attributed to a number of concerns, which we discuss in more detail in Section III.C: a constitutional concern about separation of powers, a practical concern about
courts’ competence to evaluate the charging decision, and a statutory
concern that courts lack clear authority to interfere in the earliest
stages of the criminal process.
Prosecutors’ virtually unlimited authority to set the terms of a pretrial settlement agreement has been a cause for concern among
117
commentators and policymakers.
Prosecutors may, without limitation, use the threat of criminal indictment to promote their own policy agenda. In some cases, the DOJ has required so-called “extraordinary restitution”—payments to parties whom defendants did not not
118
technically harm. For example,
[one] DPA required the organization to provide uncompensated medical care to the state’s residents, while an NPA required the company to
provide funding for a not-for-profit organization to support projects designed to improve the quality and affordability of health care services in
the state. Another DPA required a company that had not complied with
water treatment regulations to provide an endowment of $1 million to
the U.S. Coast Guard Academy for the purposes of enhancing the study

115

Most judges randomly polled by the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
did not hold a hearing to review a DPA and its terms. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 45, at 25 (reporting that nine out of twelve district court and magistrate judges who handled cases involving DPAs did not hold hearings to review the
DPAs or their terms).
116
Garrett, supra note 17, at 906 (“Federal courts are more involved in reviewing
plea bargains than charging decisions, but judges still remain highly deferential.”).
117
See id. at 856-57 (noting several criticisms of prosecutors’ power regarding criminal settlements). Professor Richard Epstein, for example, compares such agreements
to “the confessions of a Stalinist purge trial, as battered corporations recant their past
sins and submit to punishments wildly in excess of any underlying offense.” Richard A.
Epstein, Op-Ed., The Deferred Prosecution Racket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006, at A14; see
also John C. Coffee, Jr., Deferred Prosecution: Has It Gone Too Far?, NAT’L L.J., July 25,
2005, at 13 (“[P]ower corrupts and . . . prosecutors are starting to possess something
close to absolute power.”).
118
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 15 n.21, (noting instances of restitution being distributed to nonparties, such as “charitable, education,
community, or other organizations”).
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of maritime environmental enforcement, with an emphasis on com119
pliance, enforcement, and ethical issues.

In some ways, the controversy involving “extraordinary restitution”
mirrors the distributional concerns raised when judges give unclaimed
class action settlement proceeds to charities or nonprofit associa120
Federal restitution laws only authorize courts to compensate
tions.
121
However, corporate defendants often accede to such devictims.
mands in the hopes of reducing their own criminal liability and avoiding the collateral costs of indictment.
The DOJ has since voluntarily barred prosecutors from seeking “ex122
traordinary restitution.” Congress also considered federal legislation
to restrict the DOJ’s use of “extraordinary restitution” in DPAs and
123
Nonetheless, Congress has all but ignored the
NPAs in April 2009.
multimillion dollar distributions paid to the victims themselves. Despite
the voluntary limitations adopted by the DOJ, no binding rules govern
the distribution of large funds designed to compensate multiple victims.
Accordingly, even as prosecutors increasingly seek massive victim
restitution awards, they do so with extremely limited regulation or
judicial oversight. Moreover, prosecutors forge settlement agree-

119

Id. at 18; see also Deferred Prosecution Agreement app. A, United States v. Operations Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., No. 06-0017 (D. Conn. Feb. 8, 2006) (providing for the
payment to the U.S. Coast Guard Academy).
120
See, e.g., Fears v. Wilhelmina Model Agency, Inc., No. 07-3119, 2009 WL 690048,
at *2 (2d Cir. Mar. 16, 2009) (vacating the district court’s award of residual settlement
fees to charities but noting that the award was not an abuse of discretion); Adam Liptak, Doling Out Other People’s Money, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2007, at A14 (describing criticism of efforts to award funds to hospitals, law schools, and legal aid societies).
121
18 U.S.C § 3663(a)(1)–(2) (2006) (mandating that restitution be paid to the
“victim” of the offense, defined as a “person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered”).
122
See Memorandum from Mark Filip, Deputy Attorney Gen., to Holders of the
U.S. Attorneys’ Manual (May 14, 2008) [hereinafter Filip Memo], available at
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/committees/criminal/docs/0608_FilipMemo.pdf
(“Plea agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution agreements
should not include terms requiring the defendant to pay funds to [an] organization or
individual that is not a victim of the criminal activity . . . .”); see also UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-16.325 (2010), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/
foia_reading_room/usam/title9/16mcrm.htm#9-16.320 (reflecting the change in policy).
123
See Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act, H.R. 1947, 111th Cong. § 6(a)
(2009) (“A deferred prosecution agreement shall not require an organization to pay
money to a third party . . . if the payment is unrelated to the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct that is the basis for the agreement.”). Among other things, the proposed bill would have required federal judges to review the terms of any deferredprosecution agreement to ensure the agreement “is consistent with the interests of justice.” Id. § 7(c).
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ments unconstrained by the federal laws Congress designed to encourage victim participation and equitable compensation.
II. COMPENSATION THROUGH CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS
Even though prosecutors have adopted victim restitution as a
criminal justice priority, few rules address massive criminal restitution
funds. As set forth below, criminal class actions serve many of the
same goals as their civil counterparts, compensating private parties
more efficiently and equitably than would be possible with thousands
of small individual lawsuits. Beneath the surface, however, the two regimes are fundamentally different. While complex procedures in civil
litigation exist to protect individual parties, virtually no rules govern
124
criminal class actions. Prosecutors thus find themselves increasingly
constructing complex compensation schemes with little guidance to
address the very challenges that have long concerned similar class action settlements.
Section II.A below describes the common goals served by class action settlements and large criminal restitution funds. Section II.B
then compares the specific rules they observe to further those goals.
Unlike criminal class actions, civil class actions have rules to (1) ensure multiple parties participate in their own redress, (2) police potential conflicts of interests among different stakeholders, (3) coordinate with overlapping lawsuits, and (4) guide the division of funds
among thousands of victims efficiently and equitably.

124

There is a constitutional dimension to the protections afforded plaintiffs in the
class action context that does not apply to a criminal case. Because parties to a class
action are precluded from subsequently litigating their individual claims, due process
dictates that they be afforded timely notice and adequate representation. See Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (“[W]here a special remedial scheme exists expressly foreclosing successive litigation by nonlitigants . . . legal proceedings may terminate preexisting rights if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process.”), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071,
1076; Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 45 (1940) (“[S]election of representatives for
purposes of litigation, whose substantial interests are not necessarily or even probably
the same as those whom they are deemed to represent, does not afford that protection
to absent parties which due process requires.”). Conversely, while a criminal class action may practically preclude victims from pursuing a civil claim, victims are not constitutionally entitled to the same protections. Complex procedures that govern large civil
settlements, however, do more than merely satisfy the demands of due process. As we
discuss below, the procedures were adopted as part of a much broader set of goals, including providing fair and efficient compensation to victims of widespread harm. The
criminal justice system shares this goal. See infra Section II.A.
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A. Common Goals of Civil and Criminal Class Action Settlements
Over the last forty years, judges have increasingly certified “settlement-only class actions,” simultaneously approving both a class action
125
and a massive settlement on behalf of its members.
In so doing,
courts and commentators have identified three advantages that civil
class actions have over individualized litigation: accountability, effi126
More recently, large criminal restitution funds
ciency, and equity.
have sought to accomplish the very same goals.
Both criminal and civil class action settlements attempt to hold
defendants accountable by enabling parties to resolve claims that otherwise would not be brought in individual litigation. Class certification in civil lawsuits allows for litigation when damages are too small
127
for individuals to justify the high costs of retaining counsel. Civil class
actions also ensure that economies of scale do not disadvantage indi128
vidual plaintiffs when they face well-financed corporate defendants.
In so doing, civil class actions hold defendants accountable for diffuse
129
harms too costly to be prosecuted through individual litigation.
125

See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS 22-25 (2000)
(describing the increase in mass tort litigation during the 1980s); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CLASS ACTIONS IN FOUR FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS:
FINAL REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 61-62 (1996) (analyzing
the timing and relationship between settlement and certification for class actions).
126
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) advisory committee’s note (observing that Rule
23(b)(3) “encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of
time, effort, and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly
situated, without sacrificing procedural fairness”); Nagareda, supra note 43, at 1107
(“For its proponents, certification of a class action promises to match allegations of
wrongdoing on a mass scale with a commensurately aggregate mode of procedure.”).
127
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“A class action
solves this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential recoveries into something worth someone’s (usually an attorney’s) labor.” (quoting Mace v. Van Ru Credit
Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (1997))); Zimmerman, supra note 16, at 1115-17 (discussing
the purpose and function of class actions).
128
See David Rosenberg, Adding a Second Opt-Out to Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: Cost
Without Benefit, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 27 (arguing that collectivized adjudication assures that mass production liability will minimize accident costs); David Rosenberg, Mass
Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393,
397-98 (2000) (explaining that aggregating claims creates economies of scale for plaintiffs to match the well-financed, global litigation strategies of corporate defendants).
129
See William B. Rubenstein, Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of
the Small Claims Class Action, 74 UMKC L. REV. 709, 710 (2006) (“The class action mechanism is important not just because it enables a group of litigants to conquer a collective action problem and secure relief, but also—perhaps more so—because the litigation it engenders produces external benefits for society.”); Jack B. Weinstein, The
Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 174 (2008) (noting the significant procedural advantages
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Like their civil counterparts, criminal class actions hold defendants directly accountable to large groups of victims who otherwise
130
may have insufficient incentive or resources to litigate privately.
When a defendant harms many people, group criminal restitution
awards satisfy victims’ interests in compensation while forcing defendants to bear more of the social cost of the harm and deterring future
131
criminal acts. In one case, for example, then–Deputy Attorney General Paul J. McNulty hailed a settlement with Prudential that included
a $270 million victim restitution fund as a “victory for the investing
132
Chastising the “corporate con-men who stacked the deck”
public.”
against individual investors, the agreement sent “a strong message to
predatory traders who dupe the system to reap millions in illegal prof133
In another case, then–Attorney General Alberto Gonzales deits.”
clared the $715 million Adelphia criminal settlement with 10,000 vic134
tims as “a day of restitution for the victims of corporate corruption.”
Civil and criminal class action settlements are also more efficient
than traditional litigation. Class actions eliminate the time and expense associated with traditional one-on-one litigation, which othergained by consolidating actions); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
MASS TORTS PROBLEMS & PROPOSALS: A REPORT TO THE MASS TORTS WORKING GROUP
(APPENDIX C) 20 (1999) (“Aggregating mass torts claims may provide an opportunity
to correct more systematically the harms that products have caused [and] to meet
more consistently and completely the compensation goals of the tort system . . . .”).
130
Criminal class actions also give prosecutors the flexibility to hold defendants
accountable without imposing the severe collateral costs that result from pursuing a
criminal conviction. See Ashcroft, supra note 61 (“[Deferred prosecution agreements]
avoid the destructiveness of indictments and allow companies to remain in business
while operating under the increased scrutiny of federally appointed monitors.”); see
also supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing collateral consequences of
prosecution).
131
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 615-17 (7th ed. 2007)
(observing that both class actions and criminal prosecutions similarly overcome collective action barriers to combat unlawful conduct).
132
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Prudential Financial Subsidiary Agrees to
Pay $600,000,000 in Largest Resolution of Market Timing Case (Aug. 28, 2006) (quoting Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney Gen.), available at http://www.justice.gov/
usao/ma/Press%20Office%20-%20Press%20Release%20Files/Prudential-Agreement/
Prudential.pdf.
133
Id.
134
Geraldine Fabrikant, Rigas Family to Cede Assets to Adelphia, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2005, at C1; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Beazer Homes USA Inc. Reaches
$50,000,000 Settlement of Mortgage and Accounting Fraud with United States (July 1,
2009) , available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/press/beazer.html (describing a
$50 million victim restitution agreement for victims of mortgage fraud as “‘hold[ing] the
company responsible for the fraud of its employees, and put[ting] money back in the
hands of victimized home-owners’” (quoting Edward R. Ryan, U.S. Attorney)).
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wise involves months or years of the “same witnesses, exhibits and is135
sues from trial to trial.” Criminal class actions seek similar efficiencies. First, like class actions, a criminal restitution fund resolves a multitude of claims in a single case. Moreover, because of the pressures
on defendants to settle early in the criminal process, large restitution
136
Large criminal restitution
agreements compensate victims quickly.
awards also satisfy a concern many victims’ rights advocates express:
such awards save victims the litigation costs otherwise necessary to re137
cover independently from wrongdoers in civil actions.
Finally, class action settlements attempt to compensate more
equitably than traditional litigation. A class action settlement seeks to
maximize recovery to plaintiffs as a whole, while creating procedures
to protect the individual claims and interests of the members of the
138
class action. At the same time, class action settlements seek equity—
to split the pie more fairly when defendants with limited funds are ac139
cused of massive harm. Class action settlements thus aspire to strike
135

Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 473 (5th Cir. 1986); see also
WEINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 135-36 (noting that economies of scale reduce discovery
and expert fee expenses); William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions:
Order Out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 837, 837 (1995) (identifying minimizing transaction costs as an objective of mass tort litigation).
136
See Siskel Letter, supra note 46, at 2 (observing that criminal restitution agreements accomplish compensation “more quickly and efficiently . . . without the delays
resulting from the formal charging of a company, the protracted litigation, postconviction restitution hearings and administration, and appeals”).
137
See, e.g., Debbie Deem et al., Victims of Financial Crime (“Many victims cannot pay
[an attorney] as a result of the crimes they’ve experienced. Although restitution can
be enforced with civil judgments, the process for doing so in most states and federally
is likely to be expensive and cumbersome . . . .”), in VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 69,
at 125, 139.
138
See Nancy Morawetz, Bargaining, Class Representation, and Fairness, 54 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1, 42-46 (1993) (considering a mixed model for class actions that balances individuals’ interests in their claims and settlement value in the aggregate). The idea that
funds should compensate as many eligible claimants as equitably as possible is also reflected in the claim settlement procedures of many mass tort settlements forged
through class actions and bankruptcy. See, e.g., NGC Bodily Injury Trust, First
Amended Claims Resolution Procedures at 1(on file with authors) (“[T]he NGC Bodily Injury Trust shall treat similar claims with similar circumstances as equivalently as
possible.”); UNR Asbestos-Disease Claims Trust, Claims Resolution Procedures, Annex
B to the Proposed Trust Agreement, at 134-35 (1990) (on file with authors) (“The
purpose of the Procedures is to provide fair payment to all persons . . . and the lowest
feasible transaction costs shall be incurred in order to conserve resources and ensure,
as much as possible, substantially equal payment for all valid claims.”).
139
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(B) (providing for class certification when litigating
individual claims would impair the claims or interests of others not party to the litigation); Arthur R. Miller, An Overview of Federal Class Actions: Past, Present and Future, 4
JUST. SYS. J. 197, 211 (1978) (“The paradigm Rule 23(b)(1)(B) case is one in which
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a balance between these competing goals. They attempt to match
substantive awards with the merits of individual participants’ injuries
within the bounds of what is practical, feasible, and fair.
While no rules require the equitable distribution of a criminal
class action settlement, actors supervising such funds have naturally
adopted the same goals. In the Computer Associates criminal restitution
fund, Kenneth R. Feinberg, the designated Special Master, summarized the distributive justice principles at play in a similar manner:
I have been guided in defining this Plan by two princip[le]s: first and
foremost to fairly allocate and distribute the Fund to those individuals
and entities who suffered damages . . . and second, to accomplish this
task as efficiently as possible while still ensuring that all of those entitled
140
will receive Notice and the opportunity to participate in the Fund.

Criminal class actions and civil class actions increasingly serve similar goals of compensatory justice: they both hold defendants accountable for widespread harm, at great economies of scale, in a way that
strives to compensate victims commensurate with their losses.
B. Criminal Class Action Settlement Problems
Given that civil and criminal class actions serve many of the same
compensatory goals, this Section first examines whether criminal class
actions should exist at all. Because many civil class actions often fol141
low on the coattails of a criminal proceeding, it is worth asking
whether a prosecutor need bother with a large restitution fund. As set
forth below, we argue that federal prosecutors should pursue a criminal class action only in limited cases, due to the costs such cases impose on the civil and criminal justice system.
Since we ultimately conclude that prosecutors can play a useful
role in compensating some victim groups, we then examine what safeguards are needed to ensure fair compensation. Civil class action settlements have long demanded procedural protections that do not exist
in the criminal justice system. All large private representative settlements—class actions, mass bankruptcies, and trustee suits—generally
there are multiple claimants to a limited fund . . . . There is a risk, if litigants are allowed to proceed on an individual basis, that those who sue first will deplete the fund
and leave nothing for the late comers.”).
140
Plan of Allocation for Restitution Fund, supra note 60, at 1.
141
See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1, 46 (2000) (arguing to preserve the separation between government lawsuits
and “coattail” class actions).
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contain sophisticated rules to better serve the goals of accountability,
142
efficiency, and equity in private litigation.
Although such rules are
far from perfect, they attempt to include many different claimants in a
final settlement that provides efficient and equitable compensation.
The traditional justification for such safeguards is that class actions suffer from a principal-agent problem. Just as managers of a
large corporation may not always serve the interests of their corporate
shareholders, so it is between lawyers and plaintiffs in a large class143
In a class action settlement, a small group of acwide settlement.
tors—usually plaintiffs’ class counsel—must effectively represent multiple stakeholders with potentially conflicting interests in a privately
144
negotiated settlement. Without rules, plaintiffs may lack the interest
145
or ability to participate or monitor their representatives. Worse, defense counsel may forge collusive, or “sweetheart,” deals with opposing counsel, compromising the efficiency and deterrent effect of class
146
Moreover, class actions may produce inequitable results,
actions.

142

See, e.g., Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 900-01 (2008) (describing rules designed to ensure fairness in class actions and other representative lawsuits); see also In re
General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 796
(3d Cir. 1995) (reviewing Rule 23 class certification requirements).
143
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 726 (1986) (explaining that the goal of class action reform should be
to reduce agency costs between class counsel and its members); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation:
Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1991) (arguing that class action attorneys operate according to their own personal interests with
little oversight).
144
See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 n.2 (1989) (recognizing that strangers to
a class action may be barred by the outcome if they have sufficiently similar interests as
a party such that their interests were adequately represented), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076; see also Richards v.
Jefferson Cnty., 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996) (explaining that the judgment in the prior
action may also bind a nonlitigant who is in privity with a party).
145
See Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and
Class Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 81 (2007) (arguing that plaintiffs are unlikely
to monitor class counsel because no single plaintiff has a large enough stake in the
claim and it is impracticable to coordinate all of the plaintiffs to help monitor). Others observe that without oversight, attorneys lack rational incentives to obtain fair settlements for their clients because attorneys may earn large fees by settling quickly. See,
e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 469,
530 (1994) (suggesting that competitive bidding may address this problem).
146
See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 883-89 (1987) (describing “‘sweetheart’ settlements, in which the plaintiff’s attorney trades a high fee
award for a low recovery”); Leslie, supra note 145, at 79-83 (explaining that the inter-
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favoring the interests of some plaintiffs over others or awarding attor147
ney fees in ways that do not serve the interests of the class.
At first blush, prosecutors seem to present less of a principal-agent
problem than private class counsel. Prosecutors have no independent
financial stake in the final settlement. In some cases, Congress has
even adopted policies to encourage government lawyers to act as
148
watchdogs to ensure class action settlements are fair. Under this rationale, public attorneys provide an “extra layer of security for the
plaintiffs” and can ensure that abusive settlements are not approved
149
without “a critical review.” Finally, class action rules were designed,
in part, to ensure that individuals who enforce the law as “private at150
Because a real attortorneys general” do so in the public interest.
ney general is presumed to act in the public interest, such procedures
would seem unnecessary.
Principal-agent problems exist, however, even when public officials are charged with representing victims’ interests. In a large criminal restitution fund, prosecutors are the primary officers charged

ests of class counsel and defendants are both met by settling early, which is often to the
detriment of the plaintiffs).
147
See, e.g., Polar Int’l Brokerage Corp. v. Reeve, 187 F.R.D. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1999) (explaining that the court must consider potential collusion between the class
counsel and the defendants when approving a settlement); In re Oracle Sec. Litig., 136
F.R.D. 639, 645 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (noting the lack of client oversight and the lack of
adversity when the court approves fees at the end of litigation); see also Bruce L. Hay,
Asymmetric Rewards: Why Class Actions (May) Settle for Too Little, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 479,
479 (1997) (articulating concerns about class counsel “selling out” and settling for less
than reasonably possible).
148
Under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), for example, class counsel
must distribute copies of any class action notice to the DOJ and to all fifty state attorney general offices. 28 U.S.C. § 1715(b) (2006). The DOJ or the state attorney general may then intervene to ensure greater transparency and fairness in the settlement.
See id. § 1715 (requiring courts to refrain from approving settlement until ninety days
after service of the required notice to state and federal officials).
149
151 CONG. REC. 660 (2005) (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl); see also S. REP. NO.
109-14, at 34-35 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 33-34 (explaining that Congress intended the Class Action Fairness Act notice provision “to combat the ‘clientless
litigation’ problem”); see also 147 CONG. REC. 22,739-40 (2001) (statement of Sen.
Chuck Grassley) (contending that class action lawyers may target state courts that are
quick to certify a class and do not scrutinize settlement agreements, requiring federal
legislation to remedy the problem).
150
See U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 403 (1980) (contending that
class action claims are more similar to the “private attorney general concept” than typical private litigation); Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 338 (1980)
(noting that class actions made possible by contingent fee arrangements are increasingly used for the “vindication of legal rights”).
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with soliciting victim input and providing compensation. Yet, prosecutors may fail to compensate victims appropriately because, like
lead counsel in a class action, prosecutors have very different interests
152
in reaching an agreement with defendants than victims do. Moreover, even the most well-meaning prosecutor may lack information necessary to effectively serve different classes of victims. Finally, in a
large restitution fund, prosecutors may experience the same kinds of
practical challenges that plaintiff attorneys face when they manage
153
Civil class action
and distribute funds to large groups of people.
rules thus provide a starting point for assessing what safeguards may be
necessary to effect massive compensation in the criminal justice system.
We identify four common procedural problems with criminal class
actions by comparing them to their civil counterparts. As set forth below, prosecutors lack the rules to (1) coordinate relief with other
kinds of lawsuits, (2) afford victims a meaningful right to participate
in their own redress, (3) ensure judges police potential conflicts of interest, and (4) provide guidelines for distributing the award.
1. Should Criminal Class Actions Exist?
To determine when prosecutors should seek collective compensation, one must first determine whether prosecutors should ever demand compensation for large classes of victims. After all, federal law
already allows prosecutors to avoid restitution in any case involving
154
multiple parties. This is, in part, because complex restitution orders
can delay sentences, impede criminal investigations, and prevent the
prosecutor from obtaining cooperation from other criminal defendants. Large funds also impose enormous administrative and oppor151

See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (affording crime victims the right to consult with the
prosecuting attorney and to be heard at public proceedings); see also supra Section I.B
(discussing the prosecutor’s role in criminal class actions).
152
It is, in part, because of those conflicting interests that the Supreme Court has
rejected attempts by state attorneys general to recover civil damages on behalf of state
residents, absent express authorization from Congress. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co.,
405 U.S. 251, 266 (1972) (reasoning that there should be sufficient private attorneys to
litigate antitrust laws since the statute provides the winning plaintiff with court costs
and attorneys fees); cf. Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Lubin, 222 S.W.3d 417, 422 (Tex. 2007)
(discussing insurance-policy class actions which the Department of Insurance, the Attorney General, or a private citizen may bring as authorized by statute).
153
See supra Section I.A (describing common obstacles to providing victims fair
notice, compensation, and representation).
154
See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3) (exempting prosecutors from providing restitution
when it is impracticable due to the large number of victims, or is so complex that the
burden it imposes on the sentencing system outweighs the need to provide restitution).

ZIMMERMAN & JAROS REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1418

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

4/13/2011 1:32 PM

[Vol. 159: 1385

tunity costs. Government attorneys expend limited resources to
process claims; prosecutors may even need to hire private counsel to
155
distribute publicly obtained awards. Large funds also force prosecutors to divert limited government resources away from prosecuting
other crimes in order to provide mass compensation.
Alternatively, prosecutors wield enormous power when they forge
large criminal settlements. Just as class actions were once attacked as
156
“legalized blackmail,” some have criticized the overpowering leve157
rage prosecutors hold in criminal settlement negotiations.
Other
critics argue criminal restitution agreements let corporations “off the
158
Indeed, corporations arguably receive lighter pehook” too easily.
nalties when prosecutors can tout the benefits of a large victim settlement. Given that some restitution funds require claimants to give up
rights to recover money in private litigation, a targeted corporation
may end up actually saving money by agreeing to a criminal settlement.
Nor is it clear that victims will receive more opportunities to participate in an agreement forged by a prosecutor. As set forth below,
criminal class actions can be improved to ensure victims submit written statements, consult with prosecutors, and testify in court. But
claimants already enjoy all of those rights in a class action settlement.
In addition, there are no guarantees that a criminal class action settlement will result in a more equitable distribution than a civil class
action settlement. Despite congressional efforts to use government
159
attorneys to police the fairness of large class action settlements, vic-

155

See Roger A. Fairfax, Delegation of the Criminal Prosecution Function to Private Actors,
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 411, 415-19 (2009) (describing the trend of “prosecution outsourcing” to private attorneys); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing
the appointment of Kenneth R. Feinberg as the Special Master in Computer Associates).
156
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (refering to settlements of low-probability claims that could impose enormous liability as
“blackmail settlements” (citing HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL
VIEW 125 (1973)); Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)
(characterizing class actions as blackmail because they impose “the threat of unmanageable and expensive litigation”).
157
See supra note 117 and accompanying text (citing critics of prosecutorial power
over DPA and NPA settlements).
158
See Press Release, Citizen Works, Ralph Nader, Citizen Works Criticize Wall
Street Settlement as an Anemic Slap on the Wrist (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.citizenworks.org/admin/press/secsettle-pr.php (describing a “miniscule
and potentially tax-deductible” settlement as the “inevitable conclusion of weak whitecollar prosecution,” which does not “offer a credible deterrent”).
159
See supra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
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tims do not necessarily benefit more when their claims are managed
by public, rather than private, attorneys.
In light of these costs, the comparative benefits of a large restitution fund seem small, particularly if private parties have already resolved their claims in a class action settlement. Some argue that class
actions could be improved by competition, and have called for dueling civil class actions, where rival attorneys organize separate competing class actions to attract claimants unsatisfied with another, already
160
approved, class settlement. Criminal class actions could conceivably
play this role. However, the limited benefits of competition are likely
to be outweighed by the additional costs of the duplicative, large-scale
161
litigation.
Large criminal restitution funds offer some other advantages,
however. Criminal class actions may be warranted when there are legal or practical obstacles to a civil class action. For example, when
many different state laws apply to a business that commits nationwide
162
fraud, attorneys may not be able to certify a class action. Courts may
also deny certification when putative class members, their class representatives, or their class counsel have insuperable conflicts of inter163
In contrast, a federal prosecutor may be able to provide comest.
pensation to many different people under a uniform federal criminal
164
restitution law.
160

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 370, 436-37 (2000) (arguing for a
market-based approach to better align client and class-counsel interests).
161
See Geoffrey P. Miller, Overlapping Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516
(1996) (contending that multistate class action policy attempts to balance the mutually
exclusive goals of enforcing the law and respecting state sovereignty); Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 462-63 (2000) (detailing problems of
waste in dueling class actions).
162
See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Prods. Liab. Litig., 288 F.3d
1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002) (stating that claims are not manageable if they are to be adjudicated under the disparate laws of the fifty states and multiple territories); Spence v.
Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 2000) (observing that variations in the law “may
swamp any common issues and defeat predominance” (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996))).
163
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1998) (finding that separate settlements of different subclasses presented conflicting interests); Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 600 (1997) (discussing an asbestos litigation negotiated by several different steering committees that had conflicting interests); Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 284 (7th Cir. 2002) (describing “suspicious circumstances” behind the settlement negotiations in that case).
164
Such a determination may raise federalism concerns that are beyond the scope
of this paper. For almost twenty years, class action scholars have debated the merits of
a single federal law to permit parties to bring class action claims. See AM. LAW INST.,
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Criminal class actions also offer advantages in cases where there
are practical obstacles to civil litigation, like when victims fear retaliation or reprisal. Victims, quite understandably, may be hesitant to
commence a class action against defendants involved in organized
165
Employees of a target company may avoid lawsuits under
crime.
166
Undocu“wage and hour” laws out of a fear of losing their jobs.
mented immigrants shy away from litigation out of a fear of deporta167
tion. In such cases, prosecutors may find that the interest in collectively compensating victims is still warranted.
Finally, there may be rare cases in which criminal class actions enjoy a competitive advantage over civil litigation. There may be cases in
which the amount of compensation to each victim is easily calculated
and providing additional procedural protections, like mailing individual notice and providing separate counsel to victims, is unnecessary.
For example, some consumer class actions may involve very similar
kinds of victims who suffer almost identical, very minor damages.
There may be less need for the additional protections (and related

COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 6.01 cmt. a (Proposed Final Draft 1993) (explaining
the desirability of applying the tort law of a single state to a particular issue that is
common to all claims); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 547, 549-50 (1996) (supporting uniform federal law to govern complex litigation); Simon C. Symeonides, The ALI’s Complex Litigation Project: Commencing the National
Debate, 54 LA. L. REV. 843, 852 (1994) (considering Congress’s “power to federalize the
law of choice of law” for complex litigation). It is worth considering whether competing
concerns of efficient restitution may, in some cases, override such federalism concerns.
165
See, e.g., United States v. Agate, 613 F. Supp. 2d 315, 326-27 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(awarding restitution in a criminal action involving sixty-two defendants of the Gambino
crime family).
166
See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (“[I]t
needs no argument to show that fear of economic retaliation might often operate to
induce aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard conditions.”); Craig Becker
& Paul Strauss, Representing Low-Wage Workers in the Absence of a Class: The Peculiar Case of
Section 16 of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Underenforcement of Minimum Labor Standards, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1317, 1326-28 (2008) (explaining that participation in wage
and hour claims is difficult to secure because of high turnover rates and frequent
changes of addresses among low-wage workers).
167
See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Tensions and Trade-Offs: Protecting Trafficking Victims in an Era of Immigration Enforcement, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1612 (2010) (“Unauthorized peoples are more vulnerable to threats because they know that efforts to seek
legal recourse can result in protracted immigration detention, criminal prosecution,
and, of course, removal.”); Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims
Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1453 (2006) (pointing to a survey finding
that undocumented workers were reluctant to pursue claims against employers because of their immigration status (citing ABEL VALENZUELA, JR. ET AL., ON THE CORNER:
DAY LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES (2006), available at http://www.sscnet.ucla.edu/
issr/csup/upload_files/Natl_DayLabor-On_the_Corner.pdf)).
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costs) of a class action for those victims. By saving attorneys’ fees associated with civil litigation, the criminal class action may produce more
efficient and fair compensation for victims. Prosecutors in many cases, however, may lack the ability or resources to estimate the comparative costs and benefits of procedures in a criminal or civil class action.
Given these advantages, we argue in Part III that prosecutors
should consider criminal class actions when there are legal or practical obstacles to a civil lawsuit.
2. No Rules to Coordinate with Other Actions
Even when class actions may be warranted, criminal class actions
lack rules to coordinate effectively with civil actions involving the same
defendants and plaintiff-victims. In civil litigation, a judge must carefully consider whether common claims should proceed through a
168
class action. Rules also exist for coordinating claims across state and
federal lines. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ( JPML)
may appoint a single federal judge to coordinate pretrial proceedings
for overlapping civil actions pending in different districts, which
169
In addition, class acthemselves often fuel aggregate settlements.
tion settlements bar eligible recipients from participating in future related actions, so long as they participate voluntarily or receive ade170
quate representation in the original suit.
In contrast, prosecutors lack rules to determine when they should
seek to compensate victims through a criminal class action, even
though other civil lawsuits may accomplish the same goal more efficiently and fairly. Prosecutors are only informed that they should
“consider” private litigation and other “non-criminal” alternatives
171
when deciding whether to charge a corporation. Even highly touted
168

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that, to maintain a class action, the court
must find that issues common to all class members predominate over issues pertinent
to individual class members only).
169
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2006) (“When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”). In practice, the multidistrict litigation statute has led to global settlements and resolutions for
thousands of complex cases. See generally Richards, supra note 13 (collecting and evaluating over four years of multidistrict litigation transfer orders).
170
See 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4455, at 448 (2d ed. 2002 & Supp. 2004) (“[P]reclusion by representation lies at the
heart of the modern class action.”); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and
the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1057 (2002) (discussing
due process limitations on binding litigants to different types of class proceedings).
171
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-28.1100 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
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government “task forces,” in which prosecutors coordinate with other
agencies, do not publish guidelines detailing how prosecutors should
account for private litigation involving the same corporate
172
misconduct.
Moreover, once prosecutors have charged a corporate defendant,
federal law seems to provide little leeway for judges and prosecutors to
173
account for parallel civil litigation.
Rather, prosecutors must seek
full restitution regardless of any pending litigation until after victims
174
In some cases, this policy leads to perverse
receive other payment.
results. To avoid compensating victims twice, a criminal restitution
fund may require that victims waive rights to private settlement before
175
they even know the nature and size of a civil award.
Finally, unlike in complex civil litigation, federal courts lack rules
to coordinate overlapping criminal and civil cases across state lines.
Constitutional and institutional concerns may limit the prosecutors’
usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm#9-28.900.
172
The DOJ relies upon “task forces” to coordinate efforts between agencies and
government attorneys in cases of financial fraud, environmental crimes, and consumer
harm. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,519, 3 C.F.R. 271 (2010) (establishing the Financial
Fraud Enforcement Task Force); Tracy Russo, Mortgage and Financial Fraud, U.S. DEP’T
JUST. JUST. BLOG (Nov. 24, 2009), http://blogs.usdoj.gov/blog/archives/425 (describing the Task Force as a “model of inter-agency and inter-governmental cooperation,
bringing together senior-level officials from no fewer than 20 federal agencies and regulatory bodies, as well as our partners in state and local government”). For example, twothirds of the federal pretrial criminal agreements between criminal prosecutors and corporate defendants that we examined were accompanied by agency actions by agencies
such as the SEC, the U.S. Postal Service, the EPA, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency, and
even NASA. See Garrett, supra note 17, at 938 app. A (noting parallel agency actions);
Garrett & Ashley, supra note 21 (listing agreements and their jurisdictions).
173
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(1)(B) (“In no case shall the fact that a victim has received or is entitled to receive compensation with respect to a loss from insurance or
any other source be considered in determining the amount of restitution.”); United
States v. Cienfuegos, 462 F.3d 1160, 1168 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that the district
court abused its discretion in considering the civil availability of restitution in a criminal case). But see United States v. McCracken, 487 F.3d 1125, 1128-29 (8th Cir. 2007)
(observing that the amount of money the government seized from the defendant bank
robber would be offset against the full ordered restitution once the seizure was paid to
the court); United States v. Ruff, 420 F.3d 772, 774 (8th Cir. 2005) (remanding to district court to allow forfeiture amount already received to offset ordered restitution).
174
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664( j)(2) (stating that restitution “paid to a victim under an
order of restitution shall be reduced by any amount later recovered as compensatory
damages for the same loss by the victim” in federal or state civil proceedings (emphasis
added)); see also United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 378, 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3663( j) and related court decisions).
175
See United States v. Rigas (In re W.R. Huff Asset Mgmt. Co.), 409 F.3d 555, 563
(2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the district court did not err in approving a settlement
fund and indemnity agreement that might fail to compensate the many victims fully).
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ability to consolidate criminal cases into the same court as a civil case.
Many criminal cases against corporations may involve individual criminal defendants with venue rights that limit the prosecutors’ ability to
176
charge in the same jurisdiction in which a private lawsuit may be filed.
Moreover, U.S. Attorney offices in different jurisdictions have different
demands and different case loads, and prosecutors generally may allocate resources from office to office in light of their disparate needs.
Prosecutors need better rules to coordinate criminal class actions
with other forms of civil litigation. Otherwise, uncoordinated criminal
class action settlements waste agency and judicial resources, may overcompensate victims, and frustrate the finality and peace that the defendant ordinarily seeks in class action settlements and other forms of
representative litigation. Part III accordingly proposes (1) that prosecutors account for the likelihood of civil litigation and (2) the creation of
a judicial panel to coordinate competing criminal and civil claims.
3. No Rules to Ensure Victims Meaningfully Participate
Unlike civil litigation, criminal class actions lack rules to ensure
victims adequate voice in the restitution process. Civil class action
settlements have long observed rules that encourage participation.
Any civil class action settlement must provide individual notice of the
177
action to all putative class members. Judges may divide parties into
specific interest groups—called “subclasses”—represented by separate
178
counsel, or they may hold fairness hearings, designed to solicit objections and produce other evidence about the fairness of the settle179
Judges may then appoint special masters to oversee negotiament.

176

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (affording defendants the right to a jury trial in the
state and district where the crime was committed); see also United States v. Cabrales,
524 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1998) (limiting prosecution to the state where alleged money laundering took place). Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a defendant can
move for a change of venue to avoid substantial prejudice, for the convenience of parties and witnesses or in the interest of justice. FED. R. CRIM. P. 21(a)-(b); see also Platt v.
Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240, 245-46 (1964) (holding that a respondent’s
home office “has no independent significance” in determining whether to transfer venue, but courts may consider it as part of the convenience inquiry).
177
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 173
(1974) (requiring individualized notice to each class member).
178
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(5); see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH)
§ 21.23 (2004) (discussing the role of subclasses).
179
See FED R. CIV. P. 23(e) (directing courts to approve a class settlement only after
a hearing and a finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate”). Of
course, parties who do not want to participate may opt out of the settlement, except in
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180

tions between representative parties.
In so doing, class action settlements attempt to give participants at least some chance to have
181
“transformative exchanges about . . . social and moral values.”
In contrast, criminal class actions lack rules to ensure victim participation in complex distribution decisions. As we discuss above, federal laws designed to ensure victim participation expressly exempt
cases that involve multiple parties, complex issues of law or fact, or dif182
ficult questions of causation.
It is unclear whether any federal law
governs the victim restitution funds that form a part of many pretrial
diversion agreements. Those cases that are governed by federal law
say little about how prosecutors should encourage victim participa183
tion. DOJ guidelines only state that, in some cases, “responsible officials may publish a notice . . . designed to reach as many victims as
184
No rules ensure that the interests of different categories
possible.”
of victims hurt by the same conduct are fairly represented.
As a result, large restitution funds lack procedures to notify victims,
collect information necessary to calculate damages, or resolve conflicts
between competing claims. For example, when BP America settled
with federal prosecutors after allegedly attempting to corner the propane market, the DPA called for the appointment of a “Third Party
185
Administrator” to formulate a distribution plan within a year.
No
process in the agreement required the administrator to notify interest-

limited, well-defined circumstances. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(3)(B), (d)-(e) (describing opportunities for exclusion and objections to the settlement).
180
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.91 (2004) (observing that a
judge may appoint a magistrate judge, a special master, or even a settlement judge to
oversee and facilitate settlement); see also In re Simon II Litig., No. 00-5332, 2002 WL
862553, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2002) (describing a special master’s attempts to reach
negotiated settlement in tobacco class action suits); Lindsey v. Dow Corning Corp. (In
re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig.), Nos. 92-10000, 94-11558, 1994 WL
578353, at *23 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994) (approving a settlement negotiated by three
court-appointed independent persons).
181
Judith Resnik et al., Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation,
and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 382 (1996).
182
See supra subsection I.B.1.
183
Federal law gives judges substantial discretion in these cases. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3771(d)(2) (2006) (“In a case where the court finds that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to accord all of the crime victims the rights described in
subsection (a), the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give effect to this
chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong the proceedings.”).
184
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 99, at 41 (emphasis added).
185
See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 48, at 9-11.
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ed parties about the terms of the plan, although the court did require
186
BP America to notify potential victims of the restitution fund.
Without rules that require prosecutors to gather information,
prosecutors may grossly miscalculate damages among multiple victims.
In one recent case, Tom Petters, otherwise known as the “Minnesota
Madoff,” was sentenced to fifty years in prison for a multibillion-dollar
187
Ponzi scheme.
After receiving nearly 100 objections to the
prosecutor’s proposed distribution plan, the district court charged
with overseeing the award found that the plan was plagued by
“incomplete” information, errors, and revisions that dropped multi188
million-dollar claims without any explanation:
For example, one victim’s initial claim was more than $320 million,
which was reduced to approximately $139 million on the Government’s
preliminary victim list. With its final list, however, that victim (and its
large claim, which accounts for over 5% of the restitution total) has been
deleted entirely. The Government’s ostensible basis for doing so is the
following cursory explanation: “Claim withdrawn.” Besides having
difficulty accepting that one would be willing to easily forego a ninefigure sum, the Court finds nothing in the record to support the
189
assertion that the victim has decided to drop its restitution claim.

Some private administrators appointed to oversee criminal restitution funds have solicited input from potential stakeholders with some
190
191
success. However, no rule requires that they do so.
186

Id. at 12. The agreement required the administrator to develop victim identification procedures. Id. at 10.
187
Anthony Lake, Tom Petters, the “Minnesota Madoff,” Gets 50 Years out of Potential
335 Years for $3.7 Billion Ponzi Scheme, FED. CRIM. DEF. BLOG (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.federalcriminaldefenseblog.com/2010/04/articles/ponzi-schemes/tompetters-the-minnesota-madoff-gets-50-years-out-of-potential-335-years-for-37-billionponzi-scheme/.
188
United States v. Petters, No. 08-0364, 2010 WL 2291486, at *1-2 (D. Minn. June
3, 2010).
189
Id. at *2.
190
The administrator in Computer Associates, Kenneth R. Feinberg, underscored the
importance of meeting with victims to hear input about the distribution plan, stating,
“I have a substantive challenge: What should the formula be for the distribution? But
I also have a mechanical challenge of how best, in a cost-effective way, to get the money
out to eligible claimants and how best to cut checks.” Morgenson, supra note 3.
191
Because Petters involved a criminal conviction, victims were able to object to,
and the court was authorized to review, the sufficiency of victim restitution in that case.
As we discuss below, when prosecutors resolve criminal cases before filing criminal
charges, there is no opportunity for judicial review. While victims may raise objections
to a DPA in court, see 18 U.S.C § 3771(d)(3) (2006), judicial intervention is rare, and
at such a late stage, victim input may come too late to effect any changes to the agreement. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
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Prosecutors, probation officers, and victim-witness coordinators
also lack rules to categorize divergent interests and efficiently deal
with stakeholders who may have conflicting interests in the award.
Like a class action, a criminal restitution fund involves many different
people with very different interests. As a result, it will not be enough
for officials simply to notify parties affected by the criminal’s misdeeds, presume that they all share the same interests, or gather li192
mited information about the victims’ damages. They need to identify and classify victims’ interests and, if necessary, ensure that those
interests are adequately represented. Otherwise, some interest groups
may be ignored in the restitution process, rendering the calculation
193
and method of distribution ineffective.
Of course, the goals and demands of the criminal justice system
may warrant different procedural and distributive standards. After all,
criminal procedures do not have to mimic the procedures and standards that exist in private litigation. However, when prosecutors fail
to include victims in the formation of a settlement, they sacrifice
important democratic values associated with victim participation.
They also miss an important opportunity to calculate damages,
identify different interests, and force wrongdoers to account
accurately for the harm they cause. Criminal class action settlements
need rules that identify different stakeholders and encourage their involvement early in the settlement process. Part III proposes the use of
negotiated rulemaking—a solution that in many ways resembles the
way a judge might settle a class action—as a possible answer.
4. No Rules to Protect Victims from Potential Conflicts of Interest
Criminal class actions also lack rules to limit conflicts of interest.
In contrast, other forms of representative litigation rely on judicial review to police conflicts of interest. Unlike individual settlement negotiations, where judges provide very little judicial review out of respect

192

See, e.g., United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 426 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (observing that the government need only “gather from victims and others the information needed to list the amounts subject to restitution in the report”).
193
Lawmakers originally sought to provide victims with separate attorney representation to ensure that all stakeholders’ interests were adequately represented. However, the
proposal was not included in the final version of the Crime Victim Rights Act of 2004. See
150 CONG. REC. 7306 (2004) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (noting that the bill does
not “allow courts to appoint attorneys to help crime victims”).
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194

for the parties’ litigation choices, judges in representative litigation
carefully review settlements to police potential conflicts of interest between counsel and the represented parties. In such cases, judges must
review settlements to ensure that the lawyers serve their clients and
195
the settlement fairly allocates awards among different parties.
Judges may also require counsel, mediators, or experts in the settle196
ment to offer detailed explanations for their decisions. Judges often
apply heightened scrutiny to class actions settled early in the settlement process, where it is otherwise “difficult to assess the strength and
197
Finally, judges look for signs of
weaknesses of the parties’ claims.”
collusion, as in cases where class actions settle for a small amount
compared to the harm alleged, or when the settlement leaves out
whole classes of victims.
In contrast, many criminal class action settlements lack meaningful
198
judicial review, or for that matter, any review at all.
In most cases,
federal courts review settlement plans with great deference to the
prosecutor or the designated third-party administrator.
When
194

See SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“[A]n
ordinary civil settlement that includes dismissal of the underlying action is close to unreviewable.”).
195
See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619-20 (1997) (explaining that a court’s “close inspection” of a settlement is proper); Synfuel Techs., Inc. v.
DHL Express (USA), Inc., 463 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2006) (vacating a district court’s
settlement approval “because the court did not adequately evaluate whether the settlement is fair to class members”); Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 785-86
(7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting a settlement that excluded an entire class without a reasoned
explanation); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem
Products—Or, Why Attorneys Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients’ Money, 84 VA. L.
REV. 1541, 1545 (1998) (observing that class counsel will often have no incentive to
“resist an allocation plan favored by the defendant, who often has an interest in preferring one subgroup within the class over another”).
196
See, e.g., Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1198-99 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing factors to
be considered in the evaluation of a settlement agreement, including counsel opinions);
Murillo v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (finding a presumption of a settlement’s fairness where, among other things, counsel has engaged in
“sufficient discovery”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.612-62 (2004)
(discussing review of settlement agreements and citing cases in which courts apply close
scrutiny for potential conflicts of interest, particularly when there has been “little or no
discovery” to test the “strengths and weaknesses” of each party’s position).
197
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.612; see also In re Matzo Food
Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 604 (D.N.J. 1994) (noting that “the factual
record . . . must be sufficiently developed” before a court can approve a settlement);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Judicial Review of Class Action Settlements, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 167, 192 (2009) (recommending heightened judicial scrutiny for
“shotgun” class action settlements that occur very early in the litigation).
198
See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (noting judicial defence to DPAs
and NPAs); see also infra Section III.C (arguing for “hard look” review).
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settlement funds are the product of nonprosecution agreements, they
receive almost no judicial scrutiny.
There may be good reasons for criminal class action settlements to
follow different rules. Unlike private attorneys in a class action, prosecutors do not have an independent financial stake in the outcome.
Some argue that civil class actions could more legitimately serve the
interests of claimants when they are monitored by “neutral” govern199
ment attorneys or other public officials.
Under this view, criminal
class actions accomplish just that by relying entirely on government
attorneys to take charge of the settlement.
Finally, courts owe prosecutors deference to the extent that a
criminal class action settlement reflects the prosecutors’ decision not
200
to prosecute violations of law. In contrast to purely private actions,
which ordinarily implicate only private interests, criminal prosecutions
are intended to serve the public. As we discuss below in Part III,
prosecutors need flexibility to allocate their resources when fighting
crime. Judicial review of criminal class action settlements also raises
weighty constitutional and policy concerns, particularly when courts
201
intervene in prosecutorial enforcement decisions.
However, because prosecutors have different interests than the
victims they compensate, additional judicial review may be necessary
to ensure that the entire settlement is fair. Prosecutors may seek
quick settlements to conserve resources, to avoid collateral consequences to corporate defendants, to hide their own embarrassing mis202
steps, or to compete with other prosecutors.
Prosecutors may also
203
lack appropriate incentives to address victims’ interests. All of these
199

See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 278-88 and accompanying text (discussing the proper scope of
prosecutorial discretion).
201
See id.
202
See supra notes 61-64, 118-22, and accompanying text (discussing prosecutors’ incentives to enter into DPAs and NPAs); see also Jeremy Pelofsky, Virginia Prosecutor Wants
in on Big Fraud Cases, REUTERS, May 21, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSTRE64 K5WT20100521 (observing a rivalry between U.S. Attorney Offices in
Virginia and New York to take on “the largest and most significant cases”).
203
Federal law recognizes that the interests of prosecutors and victims may diverge. As discussed in subsection II.B.1, under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act, the DOJ
established a Victim’s Rights Ombudsman to hear victim complaints about the federal
prosecutor handling the case. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f)(2)(A) (2006). Victims may move
separately in federal court when the district court denies the relief sought. Id.
§ 3771(d)(3). Those protections are not sufficient in cases with multiple victims.
Putting aside the express exceptions for restitution in “complex” or “multiple” victim
cases, victims may not be sophisticated or active enough to petition the ombudsman or
court to vindicate their interests.
200
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conditions threaten the ultimate fairness of any final criminal class action settlement.
Recently, some courts have scrutinized criminal class action
settlements. Days before sentencing, Judge Jack B. Weinstein, an
experienced jurist and scholar in the area of mass litigation, found
that the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York had failed
to justify her decision not to seek restitution for thousands of victims
204
of a $100 million advertising scheme by Newsday.
The court
appointed a magistrate judge to examine the sufficiency of notice, the
identities of the victims who recovered funds, and the sufficiency of
205
Judge Weinstein ultimately found that the
the entire settlement.
prosecutor’s refusal to seek more compensation was justified after the
prosecutor submitted evidence that notice was sufficient and that
206
Newsday paid over $90 million to victims. However, absent prodding
by the court, questions critical to the task of complex compensation
might have have gone unaddressed.
Of course, because the Newsday case involved a number of criminal convictions and pleas, the court was statutorily authorized to re207
view the sufficiency of victim restitution.
Had the prosecutors in
those cases settled before filing criminal charges, there may have been
no opportunity for judicial review.
Commentators have questioned the effectiveness of judicial review
in class action settlements, noting that courts themselves may lack in208
formation necessary to evaluate the fairness of a settlement.
At a
minimum, however, courts can demand that prosecutors explain the
204

United States v. Brennan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 378, 391 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that
although the court asked the government to consider restitution, it remained unaddressed). Newspaper publishers Newsday and Hoy agreed to pay forfeiture to the United
States in the amount of $15 million and another $90 million to advertisers. See Agreement Between Newsday, Inc., Hoy Publ’ns LLC, & the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern Dist. of N.Y. at 4, 6, In re Newsday Litig., No. 08-0096 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2007), available at http://lib.law.virginia/Garrett/prosecution_agreements/pdf/newsday.pdf.
205
United States v. Brennan (In re Newsday Litig.), No. 08-0096, 2008 WL
4279570, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2008) (reporting the magistrate’s findings).
206
Id. at *2-3.
207
Federal courts can reject a plea agreement and order restitution as part of a
conviction. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(5) (detailing the procedures for accepting or
rejecting a plea agreement); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(a)-(b)
(2007) (describing judicial discretion to assess fines or civil restitution).
208
See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805, 808
(1997) (noting judges’ “lack of access to quality information” and dependence on the
parties involved); William B. Rubenstein, The Fairness Hearing: Adversarial and Regulatory Approaches, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1435, 1445 (2006) (observing that judges “suffer from
a remarkable informational deficit in the fairness-hearing process”).
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complex trade-offs they have made in arriving at a settlement and
require a reasonable decisionmaking process when prosecutors arrive
at a distribution that affects restitution to thousands of potential
victims. In so doing, courts can police conflicts of interest in criminal
class actions without compromising prosecutorial discretion. Part III
accordingly argues that courts should review criminal class action
settlements with the “hard look” that the court implicitly endorsed in
the Newsday case.
5. No Rules to Distribute Awards Equitably
Prosecutors also lack standards for distributing awards. In class
action litigation, courts review whether the settlement roughly ap209
proximates the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.
Courts and administrators also attempt to assure “horizontal equity”—when funds compensate similarly situated plaintiffs equally. Finally, class action settlements
seek “rough justice” in cases where individual damage calculations are
210
Rough justice means that representatives may adjust or avdifficult.
erage settlement amounts in light of the practical limitations of com211
In
pensating many people through a massive settlement scheme.
209

See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the proposal would bind class members, the
court may approve it only after a hearing and on finding that it is fair, reasonable and
accurate.”); see also Rubenstein, supra note 208, at 1468-71 (noting cases that supplement and explain the requirements of Rule 23(e)). Federal courts have developed a
common set of factors, which include:
(1) likelihood of recovery, or likelihood of success;
(2) amount and nature of discovery or evidence;
(3) settlement terms and conditions;
(4) recommendation and experience of counsel;
(5) future expense and likely duration of litigation;
(6) recommendation of neutral parties, if any;
(7) number of objectors and nature of objections; and
(8) the presence of good faith and the absence of collusion.
4 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 11:43 (4th ed.
2002).
210
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04 cmt. f (2010) (explaining rough justice as a plan that minimizes differences in claims); Matthew Diller,
Tort and Social Welfare Principles in the Victim Compensation Fund, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 719,
737-38 (2003) (describing principles of equitable compensation in class action settlements).
211
For example, it is not uncommon for a large settlement fund to follow “damage
averaging,” using grids or compensation schemes that ignore some components of an
individual claim to expedite payment to many different people. See In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 342 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“‘Fluid recoveries’ of
this type, which do not call for direct calculation and distribution of precise recoveries
to the class members, can be a fair means of delivering value to class members without
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some cases, class action settlements may distribute funds to unrelated
charities and nonprofits, but only as a last resort and after multiple ef212
forts are made to identify victims with meritorious claims.
By comparison, few principles govern the way prosecutors distribute victim compensation funds. For example, in cases involving a
small number of victims, federal law requires prosecutors and courts
to compensate according to identifiable injuries that were “proximate213
ly” caused by the defendant’s misconduct. However, no similar limitation applies to criminal cases involving many victims. The DOJ’s
self-imposed ban on “extraordinary restitution” was a direct response
to criticism that prosecutors lacked any legal restriction on their abili214
ty to dictate the restitution terms of prosecution agreements.
Beyond the recent bar on “extraordinary restitution,” no other
guidance exists for prosecutors or courts to distribute funds among
groups of victims. In the Computer Associates case, for example, the
federal prosecutor appointed Kenneth Feinberg as a special master to
215
distribute hundreds of millions to many kinds of victims.
Among
other things, Special Master Feinberg had to consider who would be
eligible to recover from the fund. Although some were ineligible to
recover in the civil system because their claims were time-barred,
Feinberg chose to allow those parties to recover from the criminal res216
Moreover, payments in civil litigation ordinarily retitution fund.
flect the litigation costs and risks associated with different categories

undue administrative costs.”); PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04
cmt. f (commenting on damage averaging that ignores differences in litigants’ claims).
212
Judges may devote unclaimed settlement funds to third parties under the cy
pres doctrine, which attempts to distribute funds “as near as possible” to the original
purpose of a settlement. See 3 NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 209, § 10:17 (observing
that the purpose of cy pres distribution is to “put[] the unclaimed fund to its next best
compensation use, e.g., for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class”).
But courts and commentators have suggested limits to cy pres distributions. See, e.g.,
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07 (recommending judges limit such
payments to circumstances in which direct distribution to individual class members is
not economically feasible, or where funds remain after class members are given a full
opportunity to make a claim).
213
18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2006).
214
See Filip Memo, supra note 122, at 1 (restricting terms requiring defendants to
pay funds to organizations or individuals who are not victims).
215
Plan of Allocation for Restitution Fund, supra note 60, at 1.
216
Just as in civil litigation, however, the special master denied claims by those
who only held Computer Associates stock. Putting aside the fact that only buyers and
sellers are ordinarily entitled to recover in a securities case, the special master also
cited the difficult valuation questions raised by such claims. Id. at 2 n.2.
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217

of claims.
However, Feinberg chose to ignore these factors in his
218
distribution plan.
No rules existed then—or now—to guide a special master in any of these decisions.
Even more complicated are cases in which prosecutors do seek relief for victims, but no civil remedy is available at all. Many federal
laws permit government actors to commence criminal actions against
parties who aid and abet crimes, even when no comparable private
219
right of action exists in the civil system. Federal actors may also ob220
tain awards unavailable under state law.
Part III accordingly argues that prosecutors should adopt the distribution guidelines the ALI has developed for large-scale civil litigation.
***
We do not argue that class action settlements set the gold standard for procedural justice. Commentators still criticize many class
actions for producing unfair outcomes for plaintiffs and defendants.
Some attack plaintiffs’ class counsel for forging collusive settlements
221
for their own financial benefit. Others question whether expensive
217

See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04 cmt. f (observing
that in conventional and aggregate litigation, settlement values reflect “risk aversion,
the ability to endure delay, and other arbitrary factors”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.62 (2004) (observing factors in class action settlement may include “probable outcome of a trial,” “probable time, duration, and cost,” and “probable resources and ability of the parties to pay, collect, or enforce the settlement”).
218
As we discuss in Section III.D, the special master’s decision was well grounded.
While courts usually consider such factors in civil class action settlements, crime victims
do not face the same costs and litigation risks in criminal prosecutions as they do in
civil litigation. We argue only that some standards should exist for those faced with
similar distribution questions in future criminal class actions.
219
See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164,
182-83 (1994) (observing that Congress has taken a “statute-by-statute approach to civil
aiding and abetting liability” and collecting statutes describing when private or public
actors may commence such actions”).
220
For example, state law bars Michigan consumers from suing pharmaceutical
companies for failing to disclose risks of a drug, so long as the company has made appropriate disclosures under the Food and Drug Act. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2946(5) (West 2000); Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 87-88 (2d
Cir. 2006) (describing Michigan’s drug immunity law). However, should a prosecutor
commence a criminal action under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act for failing to
disclose adverse side-effects against the same company, the prosecutor could recover
restitution for those same victims. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (prohibiting misbranded
drugs in interstate commerce).
221
See, e.g., Weinberger v. Kendrick, 698 F.2d 61, 73 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly, J.)
(scrutinizing a settlement to ensure the absence of collusion or undue pressure to settle); Robin J. Effron, The Plaintiff Neutrality Principle: Pleading Complex Litigation in the
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procedures, like personalized notice, are always justified—particularly
when the settlement only offers class members very small awards or
222
In fact, one could argue that prosecutors, as public sercoupons.
vants, may accomplish traditional class action goals more accountably
and inexpensively than private attorneys. After all, prosecutorial settlements serve many of the same functions as a class action settlement,
but without big contingency fees.
However, criminal class actions raise significant concerns. They
not only impose administrative and institutional costs on the prosecutor, but they also undermine legitimacy by forcing defendants to negotiate these agreements under the coercive threat of criminal indictment. Moreover, as discussed above, prosecutors lack critical
safeguards that otherwise exist in private litigation to assure that massive victim-restitution schemes are fair, efficient, and equitable.
In sum, both criminal and civil class action settlements share a
common structural problem that exists in all large lawsuits: a loss of
“control” by persons who otherwise may never get their day in court.
In both criminal and civil class actions, there are practical limits to the
extent to which any massive scheme can encourage and represent the
interests of so many people, all with varying degrees of interest in a
settlement. It is for these reasons that courts cannot certify civil class
223
action settlements without meeting very strict requirements.
Prosecutors can explore ways to improve claimant control using
procedures common to class actions. Prosecutors can also encourage
additional participation, judicial review, and coordination without
compromising their ability to fight crime. Part III proposes four such
reforms.

Era of Twombly and Iqbal, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1997, 2033 (2010) (collecting commentary that criticizes class settlements where “plaintiffs’ lawyers walk away with hefty
fees from a favorable settlement . . . [and] plaintiffs recoup little, if any, of the award”).
222
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.04 (recommending
that courts weigh the “cost of notice and the likely recovery involved” to determine
whether individual notice is necessary); id. § 3.04 cmt. a (“In many cases, personal notice may not make economic sense.”); Kenneth W. Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs
It?, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 97, 98-100 (criticizing the individual notice requirement set
forth in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
223
See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 864 (1999) (“[T]he applicability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B) to a fund and plan purporting to liquidate actual and potential
tort claims is subject to question, and its purported application in this case was in any
event improper.”); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628-29 (1997) (decertifying a class settlement of asbestos claims for failure to establish “common issue
predominance and adequacy of representation”).
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III. TOWARD A NEW CRIMINAL CLASS ACTION
Prosecutors need not go so far as to guarantee exactly the same
process as a class action settlement for criminal restitution. A large
restitution fund does not have the same res judicata or collateral estoppel effect as a civil class action. Moreover, prosecutors need to
balance a victim’s interest in litigation against the prosecutor’s public
mission. Finally, prosecutors undoubtedly require some discretion to
do their jobs. In contrast to purely private actions, prosecutors need
flexibility to evaluate their resources to investigate and prosecute
crime. To that end, we recommend that prosecutors adopt procedures from private litigation and public law when they seek to com224
pensate victims for collectively felt criminal harm.
Accordingly, this Part recommends four such rules for criminal
class actions: (1) that prosecutors and courts coordinate large criminal restitution awards with the civil system, (2) that prosecutors (or
their appointed agents and officers) afford a mediation-like process to
encourage victim participation in the restitution process, (3) that
courts review victim restitution schemes to police potential conflicts of
interest, and (4) that prosecutors use principles based on the ALI’s
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation to distribute awards.
A. Coordination of Civil and Criminal Class Actions
Prosecutors need guiding principles and procedures to coordinate criminal restitution settlements with other forms of private litiga224

In doing so, we note that we are not the first to propose introducing procedural protections from both private and public law into the criminal justice system. As
prosecutors increasingly control criminal law outcomes, scholars have looked to administrative law to prevent prosecutorial abuse. Plea bargaining, for example, has
been characterized as an informal system of administrative adjudication. Scholars have
thus recommended that prosecutors openly describe the basis for charging decisions,
notify the public when they intend to enforce vague penal laws, or even hold formal
hearings with internal appeals as part of the plea bargaining process. See, e.g., Barkow,
supra note 26, at 895-906 (proposing a structural separation between U.S. Attorneys
who decide to prosecute cases and those who litigate the cases); Lynch, supra note 26,
at 2145-51 (proposing a hybrid model of prosecution that includes the favorable features of current prosecutorial regimes and administrative law). In fact, prosecutors
who forge class action–like funds may learn a great deal from administrative law; class
action settlement funds have long used payout grids and techniques resembling administrative rulemaking. See RICHARD A. NAGAREDA, MASS TORTS IN A WORLD OF SETTLEMENT 57-70 (2007) (describing use of compensation grids in mass tort settlements,
social security, and other administrative compensation schemes); Richard A. Nagareda,
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 921 (1996) (describing class
settlements as “miniature” administrative agencies).
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tion. This Section argues that criminal class action settlements should
complement private aggregate settlements. Prosecutors should assess
whether a parallel class action settlement is likely before they seek to
negotiate and distribute settlement awards on their own. Otherwise,
criminal class action settlements may duplicate private litigation at an
unnecessary cost to the prosecutors’ efforts to fight crime.
Federal courts, where possible, should also coordinate litigation
across state lines when prosecutors and private parties file overlapping
lawsuits. A court’s ability to coordinate will likely depend upon who
files first. When prosecutors file charges before plaintiffs file a civil
action involving the same defendants and the same victims, a procedural mechanism, like the JPML, could centralize proceedings before
the judge handling the criminal case. When the plaintiffs are the first
to file, constitutional and institutional concerns may limit the prosecutor’s ability to file the criminal case in the same court. The criminal
and civil courts, however, may informally coordinate with each other
to avoid duplication, unnecessary expense, and unfair settlement distributions. In such cases, prosecutors should adopt internal procedures to ensure that judges handling parallel civil proceedings are informed about efforts to provide restitution to similar victims through
a criminal class action.
1. Complementary Criminal Class Action Settlements
We argue that prosecutors should seek large-scale compensation
only when there is strong evidence that neither a civil class action nor
individual private litigation will hold defendants accountable, efficiently resolve multiple claims, or equitably distribute victim compensation. When a class action will achieve the goals of accountability, efficiency, and equity, a parallel criminal class action settlement may
waste resources, overcompensate victims, and frustrate the finality and
225
peace ordinarily sought in other forms of representative litigation.

225

In other contexts, commentators have argued that public actors should seek
outcomes that complement private litigation to avoid waste and duplication. See, e.g.,
Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS. LAW.
317, 345-46 (2008) (concluding that the SEC’s new role in providing investor compensation in securities fraud cases unnecessarily duplicates private securities fraud class
actions); Verity Winship, Fair Funds and the SEC’s Compensation of Injured Investors, 60
FLA. L. REV. 1103, 1134-41 (2008) (proposing a framework for the SEC to determine
whether to use its power to create a victims’ compensation scheme when private and
public actions are available); Zimmerman, supra note 12 (manuscript at 57)
(“[A]gencies should seek large scale compensation only when there is strong evidence
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Similarly, there will be some cases where a class action is too unwieldy
and expensive, and individual private litigation will offer superior
procedural protections to victims while effectively holding defendants
accountable. However, when neither civil class actions nor private litigation adequately achieve the goals of accountability, efficiency, and
equity, prosecutors should consider pursuing a criminal class action.
In many cases, this determination will be straightforward. As a
general matter, prosecutors should presume that the civil system will
competently provide an efficient and equitable resolution of the matter that adequately holds defendants accountable when they harm
multiple victims. As discussed above, the civil system has developed
sophisticated procedures to resolve cases involving widespread harm,
and there is little reason to assume the criminal system can do it better. In some instances, however, barriers may exist to civil litigation.
A criminal restitution fund may be warranted in cases in which the vic226
tims fear the defendant will retaliate against them if they file suit. On
the other hand, when the parties already have settled claims in a class
action, the prosecutor need not establish a separate restitution fund.
There will be times where prosecutors must make decisions about
restitution before a class action is filed or settled, and when the barriers to civil litigation will be less obvious. In such cases, a prosecutor
should begin by evaluating the “variability” and “marketability” of po227
tential claims. A group of claims are highly “variable” when they differ significantly from each other. Claims are less “marketable” when
they promise small verdicts or settlement values. Courts often refuse
to certify class actions when claims are very highly variable. When
claims are less marketable, private parties and attorneys may lack resources or incentives to pursue individual litigation.
Consider Table 1, reproduced from a reporters’ note to the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation, which outlines occasions when

that neither a class action nor individual private litigation will hold defendants accountable, efficiently resolve multiple claims, and equitably distribute victim compensation.”).
226
See supra notes 165-67 and accompanying text (noting that victims of organized
crime, employees, and undocumented workers often hesitate to bring lawsuits for fear
of retaliation).
227
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.02 cmt. b (identifying
“viability” and “variation” as two considerations for whether aggregate treatment is superior to “other realistic procedural alternatives”); Samuel Issacharoff, Group Litigation
of Consumer Claims: Lessons from the U.S. Experience, 34 TEX. INT’L L.J. 135, 149-50 (1999)
(describing the relationship between “variability” and “value,” and how that relationship affects the potential for class actions).
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class actions (and other forms of private aggregation, like large-scale
228
bankruptcies) are better than other forms of individual litigation:
Table 1: Effect of Variability and Value on Class Treatment
of Individual Claims
Low Variance Between

High Variance Between

Individual Claims

Individual Claims

Low Value of Individual

Class actions indispensible

Private enforcement difficult

Claims

for private prosecution

because of manageability

High Value of Individual

Class actions necessary but

Aggregate treatment not essen-

Claims

greater concern for right of

tial and class actions held

individual opt-out and

suspect

concerns

other control

Cases involving claims with low variability and low marketability,
such as consumer cases that only involve small dollar amounts, can
generally be resolved effectively by civil class actions. Conversely, cases
that are both highly variable and marketable, like a mass tort case,
may be resolved more competently through individual one-on-one lit229
igation.
Cases involving low variability and highly marketable
claims, like some antitrust and commercial litigation, can be effective230
ly resolved by either class actions or individual litigation.
228

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 2.02 reporters’ note cmt. b
(quoting Issacharoff, supra note 227, at 149).
229
The cases involving the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx provide a good example
of highly variable and highly marketable claims. Courts rejected class actions because
the individual circumstances that gave rise to each claim varied substantially. See In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 459 (E.D. La. 2006) (denying the class action
because “individualized factual issues concerning specific causation and damages dominate this litigation and create independent hurdles to certification”); Int’l Union of
Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929 A.2d 1076, 1088
(N.J. 2007) (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that a “fraud on the market” theory sufficed to illustrate that the case was appropriate for a class action). The high value of
each claim, however, ensured that the vast majority of plaintiffs (if not all) were able to
initiate an individual suit against the drug manufacturer through coordinated civil litigation. See Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigation: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 138 (2010)
(“Over 1,100 law firms participated in the Vioxx litigation alone.”).
230
Securities law class actions, for example, comprise the greatest share of class
action settlements over the past decade. Almost half of the 5179 class action claims
pending in federal court as of September 2004 were securities class actions. LEONIDAS
RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE U.S.
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In light of the above, prosecutors should scrutinize cases as they
become more variable and less marketable. In such cases courts may
refuse to certify a class action, and there may be insufficient incentive
for private actors to resolve the case through individual suits. For example, an employment lawsuit that occurs across multiple state lines
may be highly variable (the claims may differ based on the different
state laws) and may promise individual awards that are too small to attract private litigators. In such an instance, a criminal restitution fund
might well be justified. Neither a class action nor private litigation is
likely to achieve an efficient and equitable resolution that holds the
defendant accountable.
Absolute barriers to civil litigation are not the only factors that
prosecutors may consider when evaluating whether a criminal class action is appropriate. Prosecutors may also consider other issues, such
as the amount of time it will take for the civil system to resolve claims,
the potential for a flood of lawsuits to overwhelm the civil courts, the
negotiating strength of the defendant relative to the victims, and the
degree to which victims know the extent of their damages. Courts
have long considered such factors when evaluating the fairness of
large complex civil settlements.
Many claims arising out of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, for
example, are likely too variable to warrant class action certification:
they vary from shrimp-boat business-interruption claims to beachfront
231
property claims to toxic tort injuries. On the one hand, a prosecutor
may conclude that these claims are marketable and that private attorneys will come forward to sue BP on behalf of the individual injured
parties. Thus, there may not be an obvious barrier to civil litigation that
should prompt a prosecutor to initiate a criminal class action against
COURTS: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 400 tbl.X-4 (2004), available at
http://host4.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/x4.pdf; see also John C. Coffee, Jr.
& Stefan Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments Over the Last Five Years 2002–2007:
The Future of Class Actions (observing that securities class actions “have long been the
largest single category of class actions,” but noting a decline in 2005 and 2006), in
CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2008: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES, at 193, 196
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. H-777, 2008). These numbers are so large because securities law class actions tend to involve low variable claims.
As set forth below, a complementary approach would recommend that prosecutors
avoid using settlement proceeds for victims, absent some compelling reason that prosecutors could accomplish the same goals more effectively than a civil class action.
231
See Ray Henry, Kenneth Feinberg, Oil Fund Czar, Must Decide Who Gets Paid: Seafood
Restaurants? Souvenir Stands? Strip Clubs?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 23, 2010), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/23/Kenneth-feinberg-oilfund_n_622108.html (noting
the diversity of individuals and businesses who have made claims to receive money out
of the BP Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund).
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BP. On the other hand, a prosecutor might also determine that the civil system would be too slow to process claims and that BP would be able
to exploit its greater bargaining power relative to unrepresented indi232
vidual litigants. In such a case, the prosecutor may decide that a criminal restitution fund is appropriate because civil litigation will not efficiently and equitably hold BP accountable.
Prosecutors currently lack guidelines to make comparative judgments about whether a criminal class action is necessary to hold defendants who cause widespread harm accountable efficiently and fairly. By evaluating factors such as claim variability, claim marketability,
the parties’ relative negotiating strength, and other characteristics of
complex litigation, prosecutors will be better able to make this critical
determination.
2. Formal and Informal Multidistrict Coordination
Even if prosecutors adopt internal guidelines to avoid overlapping
civil and criminal settlements, the guidelines will not be foolproof.
There will still be occasions when plaintiffs and prosecutors commence parallel actions, and those actions will settle at different times.
233
An amendment to the rules governing multidistrict litigation, however, could centralize criminal and civil class action proceedings before a single federal judge.
Without a centralized forum, different courts may oversee criminal
settlement distributions and private class action settlements involving
the same parties. This, in turn, may create confusion, leading to potentially unfair overlapping awards for some and insufficient awards for
others. Moreover, by centralizing cases, courts will have greater information and be better equipped to review the adequacy of settlements.
Amending the rules governing multidistrict litigation could allow
the JPML to select a single federal judge to coordinate and oversee
both a criminal restitution fund and the pretrial phases of all the related federal lawsuits. The JPML generally certifies an action for multidistrict litigation on a petition from either plaintiffs or defendants

232

Conversely, the prosecutor may decide to set up a limited fund. For example,
the prosecutor might decide to cover business-interruption claims, but not cover as-yetunknown damages for health and environmental claims.
233
See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006) (authorizing the JPML to transfer pending civil
lawsuits involving “common questions of fact” to a single district court for consolidated
proceedings).
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when parties bring lawsuits in many different courts. The JPML has
the expertise to evaluate whether a case is complex enough to warrant
235
pretrial coordination.
Criminal class action settlements, on their face, do not easily fit
within the JPML framework. As discussed above, constitutional and
institutional concerns may limit the prosecutor’s ability to shift a crim236
inal case to another court.
When the prosecutor files first, an
amendment to the rules governing the JPML could allow courts to
consolidate parallel class action litigation in the federal court that
handles the criminal case. A centralized mechanism to coordinate actions would save resources and assure that criminal and civil class action settlements do not overcompensate victims. A single federal
court would conduct hearings to assess the adequacy of individual
awards from two different settlements and offset overlapping criminal
restitution awards to putative class members.
On the other hand, consolidation could still take place when private plaintiffs file first, but only if individual defendants and the U.S.
Attorney agree. Individual defendants could raise meritorious objections to transferring venue. Moreover, prosecutors may have institutional and practical reasons to avoid splitting a case across different
237
jurisdictions.
In those cases, criminal and civil courts could informally coordinate actions across federal districts. This is consistent with judicial efforts to informally coordinate efforts in complex actions between state
238
and federal court.
Prosecuting attorneys could be obliged to produce information to the judge overseeing the civil case, including the
234

See Ostolaza & Hartmann, supra note 13, at 51-63 (explaining the procedures
for initiating multidistrict litigation).
235
The JPML maintains detailed statistical summaries of its activities. See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION (2007), available at http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JPML_Statistical_
Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation_2007.pdf.
According to calculations current
through September 30, 2007, 265,269 actions have been subjected to multidistrict litigation proceedings since the JPML’s inception in 1968. Id.
236
See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
237
See supra subsection II.B.2 (providing some considerations that affect whether
prosecutors will choose to compensate the victims by way of a criminal class action).
238
See William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1690 (1992) (noting informal
state-federal cooperation, including “calendar coordination, coordinated discovery,
joint settlement efforts, and joint motions hearings and rulings”); Byron G. Stier, Resolving the Class Action Crisis: Mass Tort Litigation as Network, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 863, 893
(“[M]any state and federal judges meet and form networked responses to the challenges of mass tort litigation.”).
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names of victims scheduled to receive restitution, the basis for the
awards, and any other related fines or money awarded to government
239
entities in the criminal proceeding.
Finally, we note that coordinated proceedings would also further the other recommendations we propose below. Coordination
would help prosecutors—or designated officials—identify representatives of different classes of victims and provide a springboard for selecting representatives to assure a fair division of the criminal restitu240
tion fund.
Coordination also would save resources by enabling a
single court to conduct a “hard look” review of any offered settlement.
B. Criminal “Negotiated Rulemaking” to Improve Participation
Criminal class action settlements should encourage parties to participate in large settlements that affect their interests. As Computer Associates illustrates, those tasked with overseeing large settlements need
to do more than simply collect and notify putative claimants. There,
the DOJ acknowledged the importance of victim input in the fair dis241
Prosecutors need a way to identify potentially
tribution of awards.
conflicting interests that different stakeholders may have in a criminal
restitution settlement, to involve stakeholders early in the process, and
in many cases, to afford groups of victims representation to ensure the
settlement represents their varying interests fairly. Otherwise, the ultimate restitution award may be entirely inconsistent with victims’
losses. In short, criminal class actions need a process to identify conflicts between victims and a mechanism to address those differences.
Other officers within the criminal justice system could theoretically play this role. Victim-witness coordinators and probation officers,
depending on the stage of the criminal proceeding, are already responsible for identifying victims, assessing their potential losses, and
242
apprising them of new developments in the criminal case. However,
239

Such procedures are common when different plaintiffs’ attorneys commence
separate actions in different jurisdictions. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 22.2 (2004) (“Courts routinely order counsel to disclose, on an ongoing
basis past[] and pending related cases in state and federal courts and to report on
their status and results.”).
240
Cf. NAGAREDA, supra note 224, at 260 (observing the potential for a multidistrict litigation process to facilitate negotiated rulemaking of attorneys’ fees).
241
See Morgenson, supra note 3 (quoting the lead prosecutor in the case as saying
input “will be invaluable in ensuring that the fund is administered fairly and in a way
that benefits them most”).
242
See supra notes 54, 81, and accompanying text (describing the role of victimwitness coordinators).
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the current system clearly contemplates restitution on a smaller scale
than massive criminal restitution funds. It is also unclear whether victim-witness coordinators or probation officers possess the skills
needed to resolve disputes over aggregate settlement awards, or even
243
whether it would be desirable for them to perform such tasks.
Alternatively, prosecutors could consider procedures under the
244
Negotiated Rulemaking Act to give private parties a voice in the dis245
tribution process. Negotiated rulemaking resembles the kind of ju246
dicially supervised mediations that exist in class action settlements.
Under a negotiated-rulemaking procedure, the prosecutor would appoint a mediator or special master who would use a transparent administrative process to identify victims affected by the final criminal
settlement. The parties could then develop a settlement distribution
plan subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
247
Congress passed the Negotiated Rulemaking Act in 1990 to provide agencies a less adversarial process through which they could de248
sign regulations. In negotiated rulemaking, administrative agencies
allow parties significantly affected by a regulation to debate and propose the language of a regulation in advance of the rulemaking

243

Prosecutors could also rely upon the work of special masters or judicial officers.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(6) (2006) (permitting the appointment of special masters and
magistrate judges in aid of restitution determinations). However, court proceedings may
take place too late in some cases. Moreover, even well-intentioned efforts by special masters may lack transparency when they act outside of a judicial or administrative process.
244
5 U.S.C. §§ 561–570.
245
We are also not the first to consider negotiated rulemaking as a solution to
classwide settlements. Professor Richard Nagareda has similarly called for negotiated
rulemaking to resolve attorneys’ fee disputes in mass tort litigation. See NAGAREDA, supra note 224, at 257-62 (proposing an adaptation of negotiated rulemaking for the
mass tort setting).
246
See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., 157 F.R.D. 246, 265-66 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(describing negotiations between plaintiff and defense steering committees), aff’d sub
nom. Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997); In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098, 1099-100 (J.P.M.L. 1992) (using a panel to
decide the forum for a massive class action); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 22.62 (2004) (describing the court’s authority to appoint lead counsel or
committees of counsel to coordinate litigation); id. § 22.91 (describing the use of magistrate judges, special masters, or settlement judges to oversee and facilitate settlement).
247
Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 561–
570).
248
See Philip J. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEO. L.J. 1, 42112 (1982) (detailing the original proposal for negotiated rulemaking); see also ADMIN.
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK (1990)
(providing background on the operation of negotiated-rulemaking procedures under
the Negotiated Rulemaking Act).
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249

process.
Those rules are then subject to ordinary rules of adminis250
trative process and judicial review.
A negotiated-rulemaking process aspires to improve stakeholder
participation, transparency, and the comprehensiveness of the settlement through private involvement and public oversight. The agency
may appoint a mediator, or “convener,” to identify stakeholders signif251
icantly affected by a rule.
The mediator, in turn, may suggest that
those stakeholders form a committee to represent all identifiable in252
A notice in the
terests in formulating a generally applicable rule.
Federal Register announces the plan to use a negotiated-rulemaking
committee to develop rules, names the members of the committee,
253
and describes the interests likely affected by the rule. The agency (in
this case, the Office of the U.S. Attorney or the DOJ) may adopt the
254
rule developed through negotiated rulemaking, in whole or in part.
Although originally conceived as a way to avoid contentious court
255
battles over agency environmental regulations, there is no reason
why prosecutors could not use negotiated rulemaking to include parties in settlement formation. Such a procedure is fitting for prosecutors who seek to settle with corporate defendants. Some commentators have already recommended subjecting other aspects of
prosecutors’ agreements, like corporate structural reforms and federal
256
monitoring, to a form of notice and comment. Many special masters
already informally reveal proposed restitution-distribution plans to ma-

249

See 5 U.S.C. §§ 563–564 (allowing affected parties to identify areas of concern
and to apply for membership on the rulemaking committee).
250
Id. § 564(a).
251
Id. § 536(b).
252
Id. § 564(b). In addition, those who believe they will not be adequately
represented on the committee may apply, or nominate another representative, for
membership. Id.
253
Id. § 564(a).
254
Id. § 563(a)(7). An agency may rely on the committee’s results only “to the
maximum extent possible consistent with [its] legal obligations.” Id.
255
See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Negotiated Rulemaking Before Federal Agencies: Evaluation
of Recommendations by the Administrative Conference of the United States, 74 GEO. L.J. 1625,
1655 (1986) (stating that due to adversarial conflict, Occupational Safety and Health
Administration officials found negotiated rulemaking “worth a try” in developing its
benzene standard); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 142-43 (1985) (discussing the emergence
of negotiated rulemaking within the EPA).
256
See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 17, at 925 (suggesting legislation that required “an
opportunity for public notice and comment” for DOJ agreements).
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jor stakeholders before finalizing a large settlement.
Negotiated
rulemaking makes that process more regular and transparent, while offering a public forum for parties to participate in their own redress.
Negotiated rulemaking in criminal class action settlements would
thus track settlement methods commonly used to encourage participation in representative litigation. Judges often appoint magistrates
or special settlement masters to oversee settlement negotiations between members of plaintiff and defense steering committees, as well
258
as other representatives in aggregate litigation. Negotiated rulemaking in this context could involve the same limited number of parties
that would otherwise participate in a private aggregate settlement.
Many common criticisms of negotiated rulemaking would not apply to criminal class action settlements. Some critics, for example,
fear that negotiated rulemaking would lead to regulations that fall
259
outside the objectives of agency action.
By contrast, negotiated
rulemaking would not prevent a prosecutor from enforcing the law.
Others have argued that negotiated rulemaking is costly and time260
consuming. To be sure, there may be times where individual awards
are too small to justify negotiated rulemaking. In those cases, prosecutors should have the option to bypass negotiated rulemaking if they
determine the process would unnecessarily delay sentencing. Negotiated rulemaking, however, may be useful in cases involving medium
to large settlement awards, where a comparable class action settlement
would be equally time consuming, and where there are divergent interests with regard to the award. Moreover, such a rulemaking would

257

See, e.g., Plan of Allocation for Restitution Fund, supra note 60, at 2 n.2 (describing a meeting among represented stakeholders, law professors, and other parties
in the Computer Associates litigation).
258
See supra note 180 and accompanying text (describing the appointment of special masters in class actions).
259
See, e.g., William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351, 1375 (1997) (arguing that
in negotiated rulemaking, “law becomes nothing more than the expression of private
interests mediated through some governmental body”).
260
See, e.g., MATTHEW MCKINNEY & WILLIAM HARMON, THE WESTERN CONFLUENCE: A GUIDE TO GOVERNING NATURAL RESOURCES 115 (2004) (observing that negotiated rulemaking is uncommon because of the time-consuming nature of appointing a
facilitator, holding committee meetings, and reviewing documents); Cary Coglianese,
Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J.
1255, 1321 (1997) (criticizing negotiated rulemaking for creating new sources of conflict, reaching only fragile consensus, and achieving its goals less effectively than regular rulemaking).
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resolve grievances among a very narrow set of interests—specific parties with specific injuries.
Negotiated rulemaking also raises questions of power imbalances,
timing, and ripeness. First, powerful interests at the bargaining table
arguably may exploit negotiated rulemaking to benefit defendants or
261
certain victims.
Commentators routinely criticize class action set262
tlements for the same kind of abuse. Opening criminal class action
funds to negotiation may expose the settlement to the same danger.
However, prosecutors or, more likely, other appointed officers inside
or outside of the U.S. Attorneys’ Office could minimize the potential
for collusion with other tools. They could limit fee arrangements between attorney representatives and the victim groups they represent;
alternatively, they could ensure parties with sizable stakes in the set263
tlement assume leadership roles on the negotiating committee.
Second, the prosecutor will have to consider the timing of a negotiated rulemaking. Should the development of a distribution scheme
in negotiated rulemaking take place before or after the prosecutor determines the size the total award? On the one hand, the prosecutors’
determination of any final restitution award and fines affects victims’
264
interests. For those reasons, victims’ rights statutes grant victims the
265
right to confer with the prosecutor well before a conviction. Moreover, by involving putative claimants, prosecutors would increase the
chances that a final restitution award would reflect victims’ injuries.

261

See, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regulatory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 1206, 1211 (1994) (noting the danger of regulatory negotiation’s legitimacy if all interested parties are not adequately represented).
262
For example, some complain that powerful defendants will conduct “reverse
auctions,” searching out under-resourced plaintiffs’ counsel to orchestrate sweetheart
deals at the expense of class members. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 21.61 n.952 (2004) (listing cases that may have been affected by “reverse
auctions”); BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 14 (2005) (describing “reverse auctions,” which allow defense attorneys to pick the weakest plaintiff attorney).
263
See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.05 cmt. d, e (2010) (describing tools to encourage adequate representation, including putting named parties
with sizable stakes in control of representative litigation).
264
Actions proceeding in federal court—for that reason alone—would seem to
permit plaintiffs to intervene as a matter of right. See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (“On timely
motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who . . . claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action . . . .”).
265
See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5) (2006).
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Victims, after all, are in the best position to know the scope of their
266
damages.
On the other hand, a prosecutor may need to determine penalties
and restitution before negotiated rulemaking can be completed. The
Speedy Trial Act, for example, imposes time limits on prosecutors
267
once they file charges against a defendant. Moreover, if a prosecutor involves victims too early in the settlement process, those negotiations could compromise the prosecutor’s ability to obtain cooperation
or other information about related investigations. In such cases, negotiated rulemaking may have to give way to the prosecutor’s need to
fight crime. Finally, if commenced too soon, negotiated rulemaking
could frustrate the fairness of a settlement. If a prosecutor begins negotiations before civil discovery commences, both the corporate defendants and victims may have difficulty identifying the strengths and
weaknesses of their case or whether the settlement is fair. This is a
common concern when class action settlements are certified and set268
Like class action settlements, a settlement
tled at the same time.
achieved through negotiated rulemaking should, at minimum, receive
closer judicial scrutiny when there has been little or no discovery, liti269
gation, or other forms of adversarial process.
Negotiated rulemaking is a quasi-public, quasi-private process that
may be necessary when prosecutors seek massive restitution awards for
potential victims. A negotiated-rulemaking process does not solve
everything. But, at the very least, it permits prosecutors to gather information about potential victims and resolve potential disputes between victim interest groups in much the same way a court might
manage a comparable class action settlement. In so doing, prosecu266

See, e.g., SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(“The remedial principles animating the SEC’s economic settlement in this
case . . . were not compatible with a major objective the parties sought to accomplish—
restitution for the aggrieved investors.”).
267
18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174 (2006 & Supp. 2009). Of course, the Speedy Trial Act
is not implicated when a prosecutor resolves a case before filing a criminal information
or indictment. See id. § 3161(a) (stating that the statute can be invoked “in any case
involving a defendant charged with an offense”).
268
See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.612 (2004) (“Class actions certified solely for settlement . . . sometimes make meaningful judicial review
more difficult and more important.”).
269
See Macey & Miller, supra note 197, at 192, 202 (recommending heightened
judicial scrutiny over “shotgun” class action settlements that occur very early in the litigation); see also Murillo v. Tex. A&M Univ. Sys., 921 F. Supp. 443, 445 (S.D. Tex. 1996)
(requiring that counsel have engaged in “sufficient discovery”); In re Matzo Food
Prods. Litig., 156 F.R.D. 600, 604 (D.N.J. 1994) (noting that the factual record must be
sufficiently developed before settlement can be approved).
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tors can provide fair and efficient compensation while satisfying an
important goal of the victims’ rights movement: granting victims control over the outcome of a dispute that involves their interests.
C. “Hard Look” Judicial Review to Police Conflicts
In civil class actions, judges play a critical role in ensuring that
lawyers adequately serve their clients and that the settlement fairly al270
locates awards among different claimants. We argue in this Section
that judges should play a similar role in criminal class actions by subjecting the compensation terms of pretrial diversion agreements to a
“hard look” review. Hard look review demands more information
about the parties’ competing interests in settlement, more participation by potential stakeholders, and more reasoned explanations for
271
the distributional decisions the prosecutor makes between parties.
Importantly, we do not suggest that judges should scrutinize the entire
agreement; rather, they should review those terms that relate to victim
compensation. Such a review, we argue, effectively balances the need
to police conflicts of interest with the constitutional and practical
concerns that are often raised to justify deferring entirely to prosecutors in matters relating to nonprosecution and plea agreements.
Hard look review requires courts to evaluate whether an agency
action was arbitrary or capricious by considering whether the agency
272
engaged in properly “reasoned decisionmaking.”
In doing so,
courts force agencies to demonstrate a rational connection between
the evidence in the administrative record and their actions. While
prosecutors do not follow the strict procedures that govern agencies
under the Administrative Procedures Act, they too can be asked to
demonstrate a “‘rational connection between the facts found and the
273
choice made.’”
270

See supra subsection II.B.4 (describing how judges remedy conflicts of interest
in the civil class action system).
271
See Nagareda, supra note 224, at 945 (observing that hard look review demands
that the agency rely upon “reasoned decisionmaking” to “guard against precisely the
kinds of infidelities that lie at the core of the agency cost problem in administrative
law”); Sharkey, supra note 27, at 2181 (stating that hard look review is a tool for courts
to ensure the disclosure of relevant data).
272
See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52
(1983) (rejecting the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s rescission of
the passive restraint requirement because the agency failed to present an adequate basis and explanation for its decision).
273
Id. at 52 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)).
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Under hard look review, a court would not scrutinize the compensation terms of a settlement agreement de novo. Instead, the court
would consider whether the prosecutor’s decisionmaking process was
274
Thus, prosecutors should, at a minimum,
justified and reasonable.
have to explain how they calculated victims’ losses, how they identified
victims’ shared and conflicting interests, and how they balanced those
interests against other criminal justice objectives, such as prosecutors’
legitimate interests in conserving resources, rehabilitating defendants,
and doling out punishment. Additionally, prosecutors should explain
the basis for the proposed distribution plan and whether they intend
to coordinate payment through another civil settlement.
Hard look review would permit judges to review criminal class action settlements more closely when the prosecutor lacks an independent basis to form a reasoned decision. If the prosecutor settles the
case with little adversarial process—meaning little formal investigation
or other litigation—courts would have more power to probe the justifications for the settlement. Hard look review, at a minimum, would
require judges to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the parties’
claims and consider how participants would actually benefit from the
proposed settlement.
Such a procedure is not unlike a class action settlement, where
courts are encouraged to review the substance of a settlement more
carefully when the court lacks confidence that “the settlement negotia275
tions were at arm’s length.” At least hard look review would demand
more information about the parties’ competing interests in settlement,
more participation by potential stakeholders, and more reasoned explanations for the distributional decisions a prosecutor makes.
Hard look review would improve the current system under which
courts scrutinize settlement agreements differently depending on
where the case is in the criminal process. Courts do not review NPAs,
276
only reluctantly review DPAs, and review plea agreements with great
274

Cf. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 557
(1985) (stating that hard look review decreases “the odds that an agency decision motivated by improper purposes will escape invalidation”); Nagareda, supra note 224, at 945
(noting that hard look review “may detect when [an] agency has skewed its analysis”).
275
MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 21.612 (2004); see also Isby v.
Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1996) (providing an example of a court’s analysis of
whether settlement negotiations were adversarial); see also Macey & Miller, supra note
197, at 192 (observing that early class action settlements “present substantial risks” and
justify more judicial scrutiny).
276
In his study of DPAs, for example, Professor Brandon Garrett found that
“[e]very judge approving a deferred prosecution agreement has done so without any
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deference.
The most significant obstacles to hard look review involve three concerns about the judicial role in a criminal settlement:
a constitutional concern about separation of powers, a practical concern about courts’ competence to evaluate the charging decision, and
a statutory concern that courts lack clear authority to interfere in the
earliest stages of the criminal process. None of these concerns, however, should prevent courts from reviewing the fairness and adequacy
of a victim restitution scheme in a criminal settlement agreement.
Some courts have refused to review pretrial diversion agreements
to avoid constraining prosecutorial discretion and, accordingly, violating the separation of powers between the judiciary and the executive
branch of government. As a general rule, courts may not interfere
with the “free exercise of the discretionary powers” of federal prosecu278
It is less clear, however, whether
tors’ control over criminal cases.
judicial review of the terms of an NPA or a DPA should raise the same
constitutional concerns. First, deep questions remain about the validi279
Given the Framers’ professed intenty and scope of the doctrine.
tion to arrange each branch of government to “be a check on the oth280
er,” there is reason to question whether the Constitution grants the
published rulings or modifications.” Garrett, supra note 17, at 922. According to a
separate study by the GAO, seventy-five percent of all judges (nine of twelve) did not
hold a hearing to review a DPA and its terms. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 45, at 25.
277
See Garrett, supra note 17, at 906 (“Federal courts are more involved in reviewing plea bargains than charging decisions, but judges still remain highly deferential.”).
278
United States v. Lox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965); see also United States v.
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing prosecutorial discretion and its limits); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (analogizing an agency’s decision to
institute proceedings against a party to “the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive
Branch not to indict”).
279
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 993 (2005) (“[T]he existing approach to separation of powers in criminal
matters cannot be squared with constitutional theory . . . .”). The sole textual support
for the separation of powers comes from the ambiguous language of Article II, section 3, which provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; see also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484-85 (1989) (asserting that Article II, section 3 “gave the President sole possession of the prosecutorial
function”). But some suggest that the traditional deference to prosecutors’ decisions
has little basis in the Constitution itself. Rather, it is a historical artifact of English
criminal procedure, nolle prosequi. Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 1, 16-19
(2009) (describing the historical origins of nolle prosequi and its absorbtion into
American criminal procedure).
280
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 269 ( James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
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executive branch unfettered discretion over pretrial settlements.
Second, federal judges commonly review other executive functions,
282
like administrative agencies, for abuse of discretion. It is difficult to
understand why prosecutors would be entitled to more deference
when they make agreements to advance the same kinds of policies
promoted by administrative agencies.
Finally, while the initial decision to prosecute is arguably tied to
the President’s duty to “take Care that the laws be faithfully ex283
ecuted,” compensation is not a traditional executive function. To
the extent that restitution serves to punish the defendant, like a fine,
it is Congress’s prerogative to decide penalties for criminal viola284
tions. Indeed, pretrial diversion agreements raise problems precisely when they lack a connection to the range of criminal penalties determined by Congress. Conversely, in common law civil actions,
285
judges and juries determine victim compensation. Thus, even if the
286
decision to indict is “the special province of the Executive Branch,”
larger questions of victim compensation fall outside the scope of any
287
core executive function.

281

See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 524 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (observing that “it is far from evident that the duty to ‘take Care’ was intended to establish unbridled authority in the President and his men. More plausibly,
the words were meant to import a limitation.”).
282
See Barkow, supra note 26, at 893 (“All agency actions are subject to judicial review under an arbitrary and capricious standard pursuant to the APA.”); Krauss, supra
note 279, at 12 (noting that federal judges, while highly deferential to prosecutors,
“commonly review actions undertaken by other branches of government, such as administrative agencies within the executive branch”).
283
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
284
See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (acknowledging that it is
the legislature’s function to fix a penalty for a criminal statute); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (“The legislative authority of the Union must first make an
act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have jurisdiction
of th[e] offence.”).
285
See Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923) (“Just
compensation is provided for by the Constitution and the right to it cannot be taken
away by statute. Its ascertainment is a judicial function.”).
286
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
287
The DOJ takes the position that NPAs, which do not involve court filings, cannot be subject to judicial review without raising separation of powers concerns. The
DOJ does not, however, take a position on increased judicial involvement in the DPA
process. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 45, at 28 (“According to
DOJ officials, DOJ does not have a position on whether greater judicial involvement in
the DPA process creates separate of power issues . . . .”).
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Practical considerations also explain courts’ reluctance to review
288
prosecution charging decisions.
Judges risk delaying criminal proceedings, chilling law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor’s motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and revealing the Gov289
The practical
ernment’s enforcement policies and strategies.
concerns associated with subjecting charging decisions to judicial review, however, are not raised when judges review a settlement’s compensation terms. Judges regularly evaluate settlement agreements involving compensation schemes in complex litigation.
Finally, federal law does not clearly define when courts may review
victim challenges to a prosecutor’s decisions. On the one hand, federal law explicitly provides that victims can assert their statutory rights
in the district in which the crime occurred if no prosecution is under290
way. On the other hand, the same federal statute explains that none
of the rights guaranteed to victims “shall be construed to impair the
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under
291
Accordingly, while some courts have held that
his direction.”
“[t]here are clearly rights under the CVRA that apply before any pros292
ecution is underway,” other courts have wavered when it comes to
293
As Congress considers legislaprecharge prosecution agreements.
tion to regulate prosecutors’ use of criminal settlement agreements, it
should consider amending victims’ rights laws to clarify that courts
may subject criminal restitution funds to hard look review at any time
in the criminal process.
Hard look review does not aim to create another layer of onerous
oversight to the difficult distributional questions raised by criminal
class action settlements.
Courts can, however, demand that
prosecutors produce arguments supporting and opposing the
proposed settlement, explain the complex trade-offs made in arriving
at the settlement, and provide a reasoned explanation for the final
288

See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (observing that courts
should defer to prosecutors’ decision to prosecute because it involves complex considerations that are “ill-suited” for judicial review).
289
Id.
290
18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3) (2006).
291
Id. § 3771(d)(6).
292
United States v. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc., No. 07-0434, 2008 WL 501321, at *11
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008); see also United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 417 n.5
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (noting federal law “envisions the possibility of judicial vindication of
certain CVRA rights outside the context of an actual prosecution”).
293
See United States v. Turner, 367 F. Supp. 2d 319, 327 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (discussing
“some of the difficulties of implementing the CVRA’s notification requirements”).
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choice of settlement terms. Courts have already undertaken such an
approach—most recently in the Newsday settlement—without
294
Formally accepting the use of hard look
explicitly recognizing it.
review would empower courts to police conflicts of interest without
compromising prosecutorial independence.
D. Distribution Guidelines for Criminal Class Actions
As illustrated above, prosecutors lack many guidelines to distribute awards. This Section argues that prosecutors should seek to divide awards according to what victims would be entitled to recover in
civil litigation. This will reduce the costs associated with coordinating
civil and criminal actions involving the same activity, minimize strategic behavior between the parties, and limit the chances for error-prone,
inconsistent, and arbitrary distribution schemes.
When criminal and civil class actions compensate different victims
under different standards, they risk promoting strategic behavior and
complicating judicial review. Some victims may raise unnecessary objections in civil litigation if they believe they have an edge with the
prosecutor. Strategic behavior may also compromise criminal justice
goals. Prosecutors may not obtain the evidence they need to move
ahead with a criminal case, particularly if victims believe they stand to
benefit monetarily by slowing down the criminal case. Different standards may also complicate judges’ efforts to coordinate review of criminal restitution and civil damage settlements. Even where a single
judge oversees the distribution, multiple standards may unnecessarily
complicate the assessment of the overarching settlement between the
corporate defendant, the prosecuting attorneys, the plaintiffs’ class
counsel, and the victims.
Additionally, judges and prosecutors may struggle to apply standards rooted in something other than victims’ civil losses. Distributing criminal restitution funds based on need, for example, may require difficult valuation decisions and evidentiary support, and may
impose additional administrative costs. Such distributions may also
permit prosecutors and judges too much discretion to make subjective
295
An equality-based standard that pays everydistribution decisions.

294

See supra notes 204-06 and accompanying text.
Need-based standards may also be subject to abuse, as stakeholders with more
vocal and powerful advocates may push for awards that compensate certain needs over
others.
295
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one the same amount may be easy to administer. However, it may not
be just, particularly when victims are harmed in different ways.
Finally, standards rooted in the civil litigation system more legiti296
mately track existing criminal restitution laws.
Unlike other standards, criminal restitution awards already require that prosecutors use
concepts familiar to civil litigation. For example, criminal restitution
statutes require compensation based on losses and require that the
297
A standard that
defendant “proximately cause” the victim’s harm.
tracks civil settlements minimizes strategic behavior, reduces the possibility for error and discretion, and accounts for differences in harm
based on well-established guidelines that seems consistent with existing victim restitution laws.
As a result, criminal restitution funds should consider the ALI’s
Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation (Principles). The Principles reflects the combined work of class action scholars, litigants, and judges.
Some courts have already relied upon draft versions of the Principles to
make difficult distribution decisions in complex distribution schemes,
including the landmark $1.5 billion settlement then–New York State
Attorney General Elliot Spitzer forged with the nation’s largest in298
vestment banks.
According to the Principles, judges, administrators, and lawyers
should attempt to distribute awards according to principles of “vertical
299
equity,” “horizontal equity,” and “rough justice.”
That is, parties
should be compensated (1) according to the losses they may recover
in civil litigation, (2) consistent with similarly situated parties, but (3)
mindful of the practical limitations of administering a complex compensation scheme.
The Principles also provides guidance on payments to nonparties,
300
like provisions for “extraordinary restitution.”
Unlike current DOJ
guidance, the ALI’s Principles does not absolutely bar payments to
third parties. Rather, it provides that such distributions take place only under circumstances in which direct distribution to individual class

296

See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6) (stating that victims shall only receive “[t]he right to
full and timely restitution as provided in law” (emphasis added)).
297
Id. § 3663(a)(2).
298
See SEC v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 626 F. Supp. 2d 402, 416-17, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(directing that any money remaining in the Distribution Funds be transferred to the
U.S. Department of the Treasury, a decision consistent with the principles articulated
by the ALI).
299
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 1.04 cmt. f (2010).
300
See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text.
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members is not economically feasible or in which funds remain after
301
class members are given a full opportunity to make a claim.
The
ALI’s guidelines, though controversial, provide some protections for
victims while permitting prosecutors and defendants to forge creative
solutions when damages are not easily traced to specific victims. For
example, federal law already permits a victim to assign his or her interest in restitution to a “Crime Victims Fund” in the United States
302
Treasury. A modification of that law could allow prosecutors to deposit funds in the same Crime Victims Fund when compensation to
individual class members is not feasible under the ALI’s guidelines.
Notably, the Principles is not a panacea for the many complex issues that confront distributions in criminal class actions. The ALI’s
guidelines do not address the difficult questions raised when federal
law promises to pay according to different standards than state law or
under different statutes of limitations. There may be little benefit to
evaluating the available claims under state law when federal prosecu303
tors operate under different statutory authority. In addition, it may
seem strange for prosecutors to include another common feature
mentioned in the Principles: litigation risks and costs. No such costs
exist for victims who make claims to a criminal restitution fund. Accordingly, prosecutors must balance the broader policies behind enforcing federal criminal law against the potential coordination problems that may result when federal law conflicts with state law
remedies. While some of these questions fall outside the scope of this
Article, we hope that the ALI’s guidelines provide at least a start for
addressing the distributional questions raised here.
CONCLUSION
The criminal class action is a part of two emerging trends. First,
criminal class actions reflect the expansion of criminal law into areas

301

PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(2).
303
In the context of civil class actions, some scholars have raised these federalism
concerns when a class action attempts to compensate victims according to a single
state’s law or federal common law. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 164, at 574-79 (discussing the use of choice-of-law rules in determining the applicable law for class action cases tried in state courts); Linda Silberman, The Role of Choice of Law in National Class Actions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2027 (2008) (discussing the failures of national statutory
solutions to this dilemma and suggesting that “a federal choice of law rule might fit the
types of nationwide classes that already have been identified by CAFA as appropriate
for federal court treatment”).
302
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traditionally governed by civil laws and regulations.
Congress has
increasingly criminalized harms traditionally resolved through private
dispute resolution and common law civil actions. Players and procedures within the criminal justice system have yet to catch up.
Second, government actors increasingly seek to compensate
people for collectively felt harm. Class action attorneys, regulatory
agencies, state attorneys general, and criminal prosecutors commence
actions seeking the same funds against the same defendant, for the
same conduct, and on behalf of the same set of victims. Commentators have largely ignored how the convergence of these legal regimes
may inform or alter the responsibilities of public actors to provide
compensatory justice to private parties. Who acts as a check against
indifference or conflicts of interest? How do we assure transparency
when disseminating information about such settlements? Who decides an appropriate way to allocate and distribute settlement
proceeds? Only by examining such questions can we shed light on the
state’s ability to provide procedural, distributive, and corrective justice
to victims of collective harm.
This Article has explored the specific questions and concerns that
arise when prosecutors mimic class actions by collecting large monetary settlements on behalf of victims. While many scholars have explored the way that private class actions complement public goals of
“deterrence,” few have explored the opposite: ways that public settlements complement private goals of compensation. Currently, prosecutors afford comparatively few procedural protections to the victims
they compensate. There are good reasons for prosecutors to continue
to play a role—albeit a limited one—in compensating victims. When
they do so, however, prosecutors should adopt procedures from private litigation to assure victims more voice, representation, consistency, and justice in their own redress.

304

See Jaros, supra note 23, at 1448 (discussing “the expansion of criminal courts’
jurisdiction . . . [and] the ever-expanding nature of the criminal law”).

